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ASYMMETRIES IN THE GENERATION
AND TRANSMISSION OF WEALTH
FELIX B. CHANG †
This Article assigns a redistributive role to the legal rules of
trusts and estates. Unlike business law, trusts and estates has lagged
in articulating a comprehensive theory on inequality. Consequently,
income inequality is compounded intergenerationally as wealth
inequality, with dire consequences for economic productivity and
social stability. To move the discourse on wealth inequality, this
Article explores the divergent approaches toward inequality in
business law and trusts and estates.
Additionally, this Article recasts trusts and estates’ legal rules
as wealth transfer mechanisms. Four categories of rules are
implicated: (1) rules that interact with the tax system, (2) rules that
govern relations between beneficiaries and creditors, (3) rules that
govern relations between beneficiaries and trustees, and (4) rules that
govern relations among beneficiaries.
More broadly, this Article contributes to three lines of
scholarly debates. The first revolves around the propriety of drawing
analogies between trust law and the law of enterprise organization.
The second is whether legal rules or the tax system better effectuates
redistribution. The third is whether legal rules should reflect our
notions of fairness or welfare.

†
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INTRODUCTION

Much of the law on the transmission of wealth (i.e., trusts and
estates) has been insulated from the pushback against inequality
sweeping through the laws governing the generation of wealth (e.g.,
business law). In recent years, corporate law has advanced a team
production theory of the firm and sought to rein in executive
compensation, 1 while antitrust has debated the ties between market
power and inequality. 2 Trusts and estates, meanwhile, has confined
this discourse primarily to the estate tax and, to a lesser extent, a
handful of issues such as dynasty trusts, spendthrift and asset
protection trusts, and intestate succession. 3 For the most part,
however, trusts and estates has lacked a coherent and unifying
approach toward inequality. 4
This is not altogether surprising. The generation of wealth is a
team effort where multiple constituencies might have played a role—
and therefore can stake a claim—in the output. Hence, arguments for
pay equity have some moral force. By contrast, when wealth is to be
gratuitously transferred on an individual basis, the transferees might
be unborn parties who did not contribute to the accumulation of
wealth. Here the law tends to defer to the preferences of testators and
settlors, displacing those preferences only under limited
circumstances. 5 This tendency is reinforced by social norms toward
diligence and success that enable dead hand control. 6
1

See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (seminal work on the team production
theory); 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-21 (shareholder approval of executive compensation).
2
See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
1171 (2016).
3
See Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax
to Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2013);
Pamela Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession,
89 OR. L. REV. 453 (2010); Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts, Conservation
Servitudes, and the Problem of the Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2526 (2006);
Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy,
53 B.C. L. REV. 877 (2012) [hereinafter Weisbord, Wills for Everyone].
4
Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, A Critical Research Agenda for Wills,
Trusts, and Estates, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 317, 340 (2014).
5
For a summary, see Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante
versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2013) [hereinafter Kelly,
Restricting Testamentary Freedom].
6
For a summary, see Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory
of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 6-8 (1992). On the centrality of freedom of
testation in American succession law, see RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE
LAW: THE R ISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 6-7 (2010). On the evolution of
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Nonetheless, this deficiency in trusts and estates law has left
wealth inequality with little redress. In fact, the wealth gap is even
larger than the income gap and has been steadily growing, 7 with dire
consequences for society. 8 Inequality hampers economic growth,
thwarts democracy, erodes public health, and foments social
instability, political unrest, and racial injustice. 9 Inequality is firmly
entrenched and self-perpetuating. Its many distortionary effects are
both a cause and a symptom of the concentration of economic and
political power in the hands of the very few at the expense of the great
many.
To provoke discourse on wealth inequality within trusts and
estates, this Article compares the law’s treatment toward the
generation versus the dissemination of wealth and advances a vision
that integrates these two components. The Article analogizes the legal
system governing wealth to a unified system, where localized
imperfections can raise inequality unless corrected elsewhere. 10 For
instance, in business law, a singular devotion to shareholder primacy
spurs income inequality, which in turn compounds wealth inequality
when the estate tax fails to arrest the velocity of disparity over several
generations.
In taking the first steps toward a unifying theory on inequality,
this Article focuses on non-tax aspects of trusts and estates. Currently,
the principal mechanism of redistribution in trusts and estates is the
tax system. However, as a matter of political reality, the estate tax
simply has too little traction—and, in the current political climate, is
likely to be repealed. 11 As a matter of broader academic trends,
examining the redistributive propensity of other areas within trusts and
estates mirrors similar conversations in antitrust, corporate law, and
financial regulation that are all occurring outside the ambit of tax
policy.
the term “dead hand control,” see Daniel B. Kelly, Trust Term Extension: An
Economic Analysis, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 85, 87-88 (2015) [hereinafter Kelly, Trust
Term Extension].
7
On the distinction between wealth inequality and income inequality, see Strand,
supra note 3, at 458-59.
8
For a summary of the literature, see James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and
Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 831-49 (2001).
9
See infra Section II.B.2.
10
See Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in
Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125,
1126 (2004) (arguing that redistributive goals are better accomplished on a case-bycase basis).
11
See infra Section II.B. See also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A
THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005).
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Assigning a redistributive role to trusts and estates can be
controversial, 12 but this Article presents a roadmap for working
through potential pitfalls. As an initial step, we define “redistribution”
as a reduction in income or wealth inequality.13 Next, we note that
redistribution is most efficiently accomplished when there is a transfer
from the rich to the poor. Scholars disagree on whether legal rules or
the tax system can better effectuate this transfer. 14 With due
consideration to that debate, this Article examines the redistributive
propensities of trusts and estates’ legal rules—specifically, the rules
most likely to govern interactions between rich and poor players. Here
the analogy to business law loses its force. Whereas a variety of
players from different stations come together to generate wealth, the
gratuitous transfer of wealth tends to involve families or other units
that are likely to be more economically uniform.
To advance the discourse on where trusts and estates is poised
to assume redistributive roles, this Article examines four subsets of
legal rules: (1) rules that interact with the tax-and-transfer system (e.g.,
the rule against perpetuities), (2) rules that govern relations between
grantors and beneficiaries on one hand and creditors on the other (e.g.,
spendthrift and asset protection trusts), (3) rules that govern relations
between beneficiaries and trustees (e.g., fiduciary duties), and (4) rules
that govern relations among beneficiaries (e.g., abatement, ademption,
cy pres, and execution formalities). The thrust of this exercise is to
infuse the discourse on redistribution with theoretical frameworks
from law and economics.
Counterarguments abound. For example, legal rules which
redistribute wealth might add to distortions in the tax system—the socalled “double distortion” argument. 15 Within trusts and estates,
12

See infra Section II.A.
This is the general understanding in economics. See PETER LAMBERT, THE
DISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 37-39 (3rd ed. 2001).
14
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994)
[hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient]; Chris
Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003
(2001); Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On The Limits of Redistributive
Taxation: Establishing a Case for Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1
(2005).
15
The “double distortion” argument in law economics holds that a rule which
redistributes income only adds to the economic distortions already present in the tax
system. See Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note
14. For instance, taxes cause labor/leisure distortions: an individual taxed at a 40%
rate will find work to be less attractive than leisure and will work less. David A.
Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
13
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adherence to efficiency (or, more precisely, welfare) over testator or
settlor intent is particularly controversial. 16 Additionally, excessive
tinkering with testamentary instruments might drive trusts offshore or
toward other favorable jurisdictions. 17 Finally, viewing the laws
governing generation and transmission of wealth as a closed system
violates economic principles on how wealth moves. 18 This Article
addresses each criticism in turn.
Part II of this Article dissects the asymmetrical approaches of
business law and trusts and estates toward inequality. Part III recasts
trusts and estates’ legal rules as wealth transfer mechanisms. Part IV
advances a framework for applying these rules to serve distributive
ends. Here the governing principles will be (1) the management of
spillover effects between rules governing the transmission of wealth
and rules governing the generation of wealth, (2) the proper balance
between the goals of fairness and welfare, and (3) maximizing
distributive efficiency.
II.

ASYMMETRICAL APPROACHES TOWARD INEQUALITY

Laws governing the generation of wealth are infused with
principles that can redress inequality. However, as currently
conceived, laws governing the transmission of wealth are poorly
suited to tackle inequality and, in fact, can exacerbate it. This Section
introduces the conundrum by citing examples from corporate law,
antitrust, and financial regulation, in contradistinction to trusts and
estates. This Section then examines the consequences of the
asymmetry.

439, 440-41 (2003). When a legal rule becomes a vehicle for redistribution—for
example, if wealthy tortfeasors have to pay greater damages than poor tortfeasors—
there is both the labor/leisure distortion and a distortion relative to the rule.
Individuals might “take too much or too little care, breach contracts inappropriately,
under- or over-invest in property, and so on.” Id. at 447. For a fuller discussion, see
infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
16
See Lee-Ford Tritt, The Limits of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579 (2011); Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom, supra
note 5. Welfare is the aggregation of every individual’s well-being in a society.
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 38-41 (2002) [hereinafter
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE]; MARC FLEURBAEY &
FRANÇOIS MANIQUET, A THEORY OF FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL WELFARE 234 (2011).
Efficiency means wealth maximization, but in legal scholarship, it has become an
amorphous concept unmoored from its roots in well-being. See KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE at 41. See also infra Section IV.B.
17
See infra Section IV.D.
18
See infra Section II.B.
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A. Generation versus Transmission of Wealth
In recent years, corporate law scholars have challenged
shareholder primacy, the notion that corporations exist to serve the
interests of shareholders. 19 As one argument goes, shareholder
primacy fetishizes shareholder profits, particularly short-term profits,
to the detriment of all other constituencies. 20 Large, activist
shareholders such as hedge funds might spur a firm to cut its way to
profitability by laying off employees; then those large shareholders
might sell their stake before the grave consequences of their strategy
set in. In response, some academics have refined the primacy norm to
argue that directors (not shareholders) enjoy primacy, 21 while others
have gone a step further by accounting for employees. 22 In a notable
opinion, the Delaware Chancery Court even speculated whether
fiduciary obligations should extend to the corporate enterprise as a
whole, including creditors, when a firm is “in the vicinity of
insolvency.” 23 At their core, such positions reorient the principalagent relationship, which forms the bedrock of fiduciary duty, away
from the focal point of the shareholder. This reorientation works to
equalize incomes, by directing agents to consider more than
shareholder profits in the operation of a corporation. 24
This is not to say that shareholder primacy always impedes
income equality. Corporate reforms eliminating staggered boards,
reining in executive compensation, and inhibiting boards from vetoing
takeover bids are all pro-shareholder. These reforms limit the ability
of executives and board members to steer compensation and also to
entrench themselves at the expense of shareholder value. If the
quintessential manager is a highly paid executive and the
quintessential shareholder is an ordinary investor, then these reforms
work to level out incomes.
19

For the roots of shareholder primacy, see ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
20
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 788 (2005).
21
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, in Research Handbook on the
Economics of corporate Law (2012); Blair & Stout, supra note 1.
22
Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and Corporate Structure, 45 STETSON L.
REV. 69 (2015).
23
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commun. Corp., 1991 WL
277613 (Del. Ch. 1991).
24
This has even led to a movement to explore new corporate forms to accommodate
social entrepreneurship. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do
the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 249-50 (2014)
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Competition policy, too, has recently assumed the mantle of
redressing inequality. Since the start of the financial crisis, legal
scholars have debated the role of antitrust in enabling financial firms
to attain systemic significance. 25 Now economists have entered the
fray to argue that monopoly regressivity is a root cause of inequality. 26
Altogether, these developments challenge the Chicago School
paradigm, whose central focus in the design and enforcement of
regulation is efficiency. When the goal of antitrust rules is broadened
beyond efficiency to include equity and redistribution, inequality
diminishes. 27 For example, a rule that prevents dominant firms from
merging ends up ceding market share—and, therefore, wealth—to
smaller rivals. 28 So, too, does a rule that prevents a monopoly from
engaging in predatory pricing to drive out its smaller rivals. 29
Rules governing the generation of wealth are not just
administered by courts; they are also administered by regulators. For
instance, competitors can sue under federal and state antitrust laws,
but the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission play
prominent roles in intermediating transactions among competitors
(e.g., by blocking mergers, which transfers wealth from merging
parties to other market players) or between firms and consumers (e.g.,
by prohibiting deceptive sales practices or supracompetitive pricing,
which transfers wealth from regulated firms to consumers). In fact,
business law now interfaces as much with public law as with private
law, due to the proliferation of regulations governing business
operations. Thus, financial reform legislation has interposed
administrative agencies onto a host of business-consumer interactions
that used to be conceived as purely contractual. 30 Even a traditionally
25

See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 557, 558 (2010).
26
See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE: UNEQUAL SOCIEITIES AND
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THEM (2015); THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY ’S
DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012) [hereinafter STIGLITZ, PRICE OF
INEQUALITY]; THOMAS P IKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-F IRST CENTURY
(Goldhammer trans. 2014); ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE
MANY, NOT THE FEW. But see Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 1171 (2016) (arguing that monopoly power does not have a
substantial connection to wealth inequality).
27
Antitrust, too, is concerned with various types of efficiency, but sometimes
efficiency counsels against enforcement. Here I am tracing the literature that calls
for more aggressive competition policy, beyond efficiency’s traditional strictures, to
mitigate economic inequality. See supra note 26.
28
Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
29
Id. § 2.
30
E.g., the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which works to redress the
asymmetry of information between consumers and firms.
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“private” law matter such as the enforcement of fiduciary duty,
customarily between private parties before a court, has been made
“public” in several settings. 31 Redistribution under legal rules
governing business is therefore occurring frequently within the
regulatory ambit. To the extent that regulators have more information
at their disposal than courts in administering a legal rule, the
regulatory turn is a welcome evolution; for regulators can give
redistribution maximum effect, while achieving both uniformity and
efficiency.
In the transmission of wealth, however, redistribution unfolds
very differently. To be sure, scholars have tried to lay the groundwork
for trusts and estates to redress inequality. Professor Ascher’s article
“Curtailing Inherited Wealth” argues that all property owned by a
decedent should be sold and the proceeds turned over to the
government, subject to certain exceptions and payment of debts and
expenses. 32 Recently, with the attention on societal inequality,
academics have called for the wealth transfer taxes to be bolstered and,
more fundamentally, a critical trusts and estates research agenda to
incorporate the voices of disempowered groups. 33 In this vein,
Professor Weisbord has proposed ways for Americans—especially the
poor—to avoid intestacy so as to maintain intergenerational economic
continuity. 34 At the other end of the economic hierarchy, scholars have
assailed dynasty trusts and asset protection trusts, which lock away the
wealth of the very rich. 35 All of these proposals, however, suffer from
practical and normative deficiencies.
As a practical matter, once wealth has been accumulated
during a testator’s lifetime, the principal mechanism of redistribution
is the tax system: estate taxes (on the donor’s estate) and inheritance
taxes (on recipients). Yet over the last few decades, these taxes have
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. 23.400 et seq. (business conduct standards for swap
dealers in certain derivatives sales); Securities & Exchange Comm’n, Study on
Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, As Required by Section 913 of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2011) (imposing fiduciary
duties upon broker-dealers). Recently, however, the viability of the fiduciary rule
for broker-dealers has come into question. See Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis,
Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama-Era Financial Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2017.
32
Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990).
33
See James R. Repetti, supra note 8 (canvassing the literature on estate, gift, and
income tax arguments); Caron &. Repetti, supra note 3; Crawford & Infanti, supra
note 4.
34
See Weisbord, Wills for Everyone, supra note 3.
35
See Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, The Stripping of the Trust: From Evolutionary
Scripts to Distributive Results, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 529 (2014); French, supra note 3.
31
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been eviscerated. Where once an estate tax rate in excess of 77%
(beyond a $40,000 exemption) roamed, now a rate of 35% (and an
exemption of $5 million) hobbles. 36 Nonetheless, given recurring
appeals to resuscitate the estate tax, the academy seems not to have yet
accepted the political reality that the rollback on this tax is here to stay
and the repeal imminent. 37
The natural alternative is to look to the myriad of legal rules
within trusts and estates. This move, too, is fraught with practical
difficulties. Unlike business law, trusts and estates rarely interfaces
with regulators. Occasionally a state attorney general might intervene
in the administration of a charitable trust if there are allegations of
fraud or misuse of trust assets, but of course, someone must first alert
the attorney general. Where trusts and estates intersects with
Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security, and housing programs, there is
some regulatory oversight, but the legal rules implicated tend not to
touch upon the core attributes of redistribution explored above: a
transfer of wealth from rich to poor, ideally by a regulator that can
gauge the macroeconomic effects of its intervention. In trusts and
estates, redistribution by rules would seem to be consigned to trust
litigation and probate proceedings, which is altogether more
ramshackle. 38
Yet there are redeeming features of trusts and estates’ legal
rules. When courts go to construe those rules, notions of equity and
fairness are often at play. Courts emphasize or dispense with will
formalities and other rules to arrive at results that protect a testator’s
surviving family members. 39 In this way, trusts and estates mirrors the
enforcement of corporate law, particularly fiduciary duty, where
courts often stretch to get to a “fair” result that runs counter to black
letter law. 40 Hence, redistribution might be meted out in small doses,

36

For a concise history of the evolution, see Jay A. Soled & Mitchell M. Gans, Asset
Preservation and the Evolving Role of Trusts in the Twenty-First Century, 72 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 257, 262-72 (2015). On the coalition that fought estate taxes, see
GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, supra note 11.
37
See, e.g.., Caron & Repetti, supra note 3. See also Ashlea Ebeling, Will Trump
Victory Yield Estate Tax Repeal?, FORBES, Nov. 9, 2016.
38
For now, this Article will sidestep the critique of haphazardness, addressing it
more in depth in Sections III.B.3 and IV.C.
39
Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235
(1996) [hereinafter Leslie, Myth of Testamentary Freedom].
40
This is why the classical fiduciary duty cases are often so difficult to teach. See,
e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928); Page v. Page, 55 Cal.2d 192
(1961) (finding that even though a majority partner could have cut out the minority
partner, the partner was still bound by the amorphous duty of good faith and fair
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between parties to a judicial proceeding, but it is redistribution
nonetheless.
As a normative matter, however, assigning a redistributive role
to trusts and estates’ legal rules violates dearly held values that are
peculiar to the field. Freedom of testation is the “organizing principle
of the American law of succession.” 41 The notion that a testator or
settlor, having amassed wealth during his lifetime, enjoys the
discretion to control its disposition is deeply ingrained in American
society. It is so ingrained, in fact, that ordinary Americans reflexively
endorse limits on the government’s ability to tax inherited wealth. For
scholars, calls to curtail dead hand control encounters equally
passionate opposition premised upon freedom of testation—often at
the expense of tailored discussions over why dead hand control holds
any normative significance. 42
Another normative obstacle is the fact that unlike the creation
of wealth, which tends to involve numerous and diverse parties, the
transmission of wealth involves fewer parties, who are often
economically uniform. Wealth generation is the interplay of diverse
intra-firm constituents ranging from executives to part-time service
workers, as well as extra-firm diversity of producers varying in degree
of specialization and market share. Any of these constituents might
have an equitable claim to a specific party’s wealth. The transmission
of wealth, by contrast, occurs within a much smaller orbit—typically
within a family or other similar unit, where the members with an
equitable claim to the testator or settlor’s wealth are few. 43 There are
some exceptions. Creditor claims cut across trusts and estates law just
as they do business law. But for the most part, the law surrounding the
dealing in doing so). These analyses often conflate fairness with welfare. In Section
IV.B, I will attempt to untangle the concepts.
41
Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 643 (2014); RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF PROP.: WILLS &
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a (2003).
42
See, e.g., Kelly, Trust Term Extension, supra note 6, at 89 (“Apart from specific
arguments, saying that a doctrine may increase (or decrease) dead hand control does
not have any normative significance. Although many scholars assume that dead hand
control is bad, asserting that a legal reform may involve dead hand control does not
tell us anything about whether or not the reform is socially desirable.”); Hirsch &
Wang, supra note 6, at 5 (“legal regulation of future interests may well require more
precise calibration according to the attributes of control which testators seek to retain
in any given case”).
43
See Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, Book
Review, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 1160 (2011) (“In most cases, however, children at
least knew their parents. Maybe, even, in a miniscule number of instances, they
contributed to a parent’s acquisition of property. Grandchildren, too, generally knew
their grandparents to at least some extent. But what about great-grandchildren? And
great-great grandchildren?”).
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transmission of wealth faces much different normative and practical
realities than the law surrounding the generation of wealth, differences
that complicate the redistribution proposition for trusts and estates’
legal rules.
Why, then, should these rules take on the redistribution
mantle? Simply put, wealth inequality is too complex and too socially
destructive a problem. The current scheme of income redistribution
(that is, redistribution at the wealth generation end) and weak wealth
transfer taxes cannot adequately redress inequality. The patchwork of
trusts and estate’s legal rules must work to fill the cavernous gaps at
the wealth transmission end. The next Subsection addresses the
magnitude of the problem, and the remaining Sections of the Article
explore and defend the potential solutions.
B. Wealth Inequality
1.

Conceptualizing wealth as a system

In recent years, academic and policy attention has been
lavished on income inequality. 44 However, wealth is a more holistic
assessment of inequality than income. 45 Income is the earnings of an
individual over a specific period, but wealth represents accumulated
assets, typically by families and across generations. 46 For instance,
wealth accrues when decedents pass on their assets to family
members; in turn, those family members may pass on the unused
portions of inherited assets to their own beneficiaries.
Because wealth is compounded across generations and within
families, it amplifies socioeconomic gaps. Not only do the poor earn
less during their lifetimes to pass on to survivors than do the rich, the
poor may have begun life with less advantage, being born to parents
who inherited little and likely passed on little. 47 Not surprisingly,
44

E.g., BRANKO M ILANOVIC, INCOME, INEQUALITY, AND POVERTY DURING THE
TRANSITION FROM PLANNED TO MARKET ECONOMY (1998); RAGHURAM G. RAJAN,
FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 89 (2010). In 2016, income inequality was a centerpiece of the U.S. Presidential
election and the United Kingdom’s referendum to leave the European Union.
45
STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 26, at 2 (“Income inequality data offer
only a snapshot of an economy at a single moment in time. But this is precisely why
the data on wealth inequality are so troubling—wealth inequality goes beyond the
variations seen in year-to-year income. Moreover, wealth gives a better picture of
differences in access to resources.”).
46
Strand, supra note 3, at 464-65.
47
Such is the luck of birth. See MADOFF, supra note 6, at 68; ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book III p

4/26/2017 11:29 AM

SUBMISSION COPY

2017]

ASYMMETRIES IN WEALTH

13

wealth gap is greater than income gap; also, not surprisingly, the
wealth gap tracks racial disparities. 48
Wealth can be construed as a system comprised of two spheres:
wealth generation and wealth transmission. Similarly, the legal system
governing wealth can also be broken down into laws governing wealth
generation and laws governing wealth transmission. To draw the
analogy further, we can even depict this as a thermodynamic system,
where overall wealth is neither created nor destroyed but merely
shifted in response to laws. 49 Thus, imperfections in one sphere may
augment overall imperfection in the system unless corrected
elsewhere.
As a concrete example, assume that a dominant entertainment
conglomerate has built up market power by conspiring to exclude
smaller rivals in the initial screening of films or by forcing cable
companies to bundle less desirable channels with popular channels. 50
The majority of stock in the conglomerate is owned and controlled by
its chief executive. 51 During his lifetime, the executive is vastly
wealthier than any of his firm’s employees. If his succession plan
transfers his ownership stake to trusts managed on behalf of five of his
grandchildren, then at the next generation, when the wealth held by
those five beneficiaries is compared against the wealth held by all the
successors of all of the firm’s employees, wealth disparity will likely
be even greater simply because there are proportionately more
successors of firm employees than successors of the executive.
Of course, wealth disparity can be fixed with robust estate,
inheritance, and gift taxes. However, if wealth transfer taxes are
feeble, then the velocity of disparity will accelerate from one
generation to the next. Assume, for instance, that a corporation which
operates discount retail and grocery stores maximizes profitability by
158 (Thomas Nelson ed. 1843) (decrying the foundation of European landed estates
on the “most absurd of all suppositions . . . that every successive generation of men
have not an equal right to earth . . . but that the property of the present generation
should be restrained and regulated according to the fancy of those who died, perhaps
five hundred years ago”).
48
Strand, supra note 3, at 466-68.
49
This is akin to the First Law of Thermodynamics: in a closed system, energy is
neither created nor destroyed.
50
See Shalini Ramachandran & Merissa Marr, New Attach on TV “Bundles”:
Cablevision Says Viacom violates Antitrust rules for How It Groups Cable
Channels, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2013.
51
See About National Amusements, National Amusements, Inc.,
https://www.nationalamusements.com/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2016); Keach Hagey &
Joe Flint, Sumner Redstone’s National Amusements to Call on Viacom and CBS to
Explore Merger, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2016.
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paying its employees extremely low (and sometimes discriminatory)
wages, 52 selling products manufactured in countries with low labor
and environmental protection standards, 53 and bribing government
officials abroad to expedite construction permits. 54 The founder
accumulates so much wealth that his heirs become the richest family
in the country. Six of the heirs wield more wealth than the bottom 42
percent of all Americans combined, a proportion that has increased
with time. 55 The heirs might avoid or minimize estate taxes by
utilizing grantor retained annuity trusts (“GRATs”), where a grantor
is paid an annuity for a fixed period and any money left over passes to
his heirs tax-free, and charitable lead annuity trusts (“CLATs”), where
payments are made to a charity for a fixed period and any money
remaining passes to an heir with minimal taxes. 56 These GRATs and
CLATs, borne of generous tax loopholes, enable the heirs to pass on
billions of dollars of assets virtually tax-free generation after
generation, exacerbating wealth inequality. 57
Admittedly, the thermodynamic model is simplistic. It omits
an important qualification: no system is completely closed. 58 Wealth
flows into and out of countries, either legally or illicitly. 59 After all,
the cross-border movement of wealth forms the foundation for
international trade, as well as cottage industries exploiting arbitrage
opportunities. 60 Wealth is simply not created or transmitted in

52

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
See S. Prakash Sethi, The world of Wal-Mart, Carnegie Council (2013),
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0081.
54
See David Barstow & Alejandra Xanic von Bertrab, The Bribery Aisle: How WalMart Got Its Way in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012.
55
See Josh Harkinson, Walmart Heirs Hold More Wealth Than 42% of Americans
Combined, MOTHER JONES, Jul. 18, 2012.
56
See Zachary R. Mider, How Wal-Mart’s Waltons Maintain Their Billionaire
Fortone: Taxes, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 12, 2013; How to Preserve a Family Fortune
Through Tax Tricks, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 12, 2013; Samuel R. Scarcello, Note,
Transfer Taxes in Flux: A Comparison of Alternate Plans for GRAT Reform, 107
NW. U. L. REV. 321 (2012); Kent C. Kiffner, Note, Charitable Remainder Annuity
Trusts: Why the Internal Revenue Service’s Approach Needs Revision, 54 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 739 (2004).
57
See Mider, supra note 56.
58
The analogy to thermodynamics breaks down because unlike energy, wealth is not
necessarily a zero-sum game in a closed system.
59
Just as wealth is distributed unevenly within a country, its distribution is also
uneven among countries. See BRANKO M ILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING
INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2005) [hereinafter M ILANOVIC,
WORLDS APART]. In fact, these disparities are the root of outsourcing.
60
See Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1048-50(2000) [hereinafter Sterk, Asset Protection
53
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confined economies. Yet thermodynamic model can still be a useful
way of thinking through legal rules, by disassembling the legal system
into a set of laws governing the generation of wealth and another set
governing the transmission of wealth. When one set spurs
concentration in wealth and the other does nothing to reduce it,
concentration will continue unabated. 61
2.

Effects of wealth inequality

The effects of wealth concentration tend to manifest over a
long period, which impedes sustained study. 62 For many decades,
hypotheses abounded on the trajectories of inequality, but
substantiation was difficult. 63 Yet the tools for gauging inequality
have steadily become more sophisticated. 64 We can say with
Trusts]; Red K. Weisbord, A Catharsis for U.S. Trust Law: American Reflections on
the Panama Papers, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 93 (2016).
61
Criticisms of the thermodynamics analogy are as valid for the laws governing
wealth as for wealth itself, since wealth flows to the jurisdictions that regulate its
transmission the most lightly. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
62
See Repetti, supra note 8, at 835-36; PIKETTY, supra note 26, at 164-68.
63
See, e.g., Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON.
REV. 1 (1955) (hypothesis that inequality tracks the progression of an economy from
rural to industrial); Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distribution, Political Conflict
and Economic Growth: A Simple Theory and Some Empirical Evidence, in
POLITICAL ECONOMY, GROWTH, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 23, 34 (Alex Cukierman et
al. eds., 1992) (hypothesis that inequality results from high taxes on the wealthy,
which discourages investment and impairs growth); Charles Garrison & Feng-Yao
Lee, Taxation, Aggregate Activity and Economic Growth: Further Cross-Country
Evidence on Some Supply-Side Hypotheses, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 172 (1992)
(challenging the Alesina & Rodrik hypothesis); BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE
ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 95 (1999) (hypothesis that inequality is a
product of the failure to invest in education); Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income
Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 149 (1996)
(hypothesis that inequality both causes and results from sociopolitical instability);
BRANKO MILANOVIC, INCOME, INEQUALITY, AND POVERTY DURING THE
TRANSITION FROM P LANNED TO MARKET ECONOMY (1998) (case study of inequality
during the instability of post-Communist transition in Eastern Europe).
64
One recent work to garner acclaim is PIKETTY, supra note 26. Piketty and his
colleagues managed to create a fuller picture of wealth distribution by
supplementing census and other survey data with tax data. Through this compilation,
they concluded that two factors dictate the composition of wealth—capital and
income—and the current wealth gap is attributed to stagnant income for most of the
economy and a relative explosion in capital for the those at the top. For one of the
many reviews of Piketty’s work, see Paul Krugman, Why We’re in a New Gilded
Age, N.Y. BOOKS, May 8, 2014. Another prominent figure is the economist Angus
Deaton, who devoted his career to refining the measurement of consumption as a
lens for poverty and welfare. For this, Deaton won the 2015 Nobel Prize in Economic
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confidence and precision that inequality has grown at an alarming clip
in recent decades, a trend that has only accelerated since the financial
crisis. 65 In fact, our country is more economically unequal today than
at any point since the Great Depression. 66 Along with advances in
measuring inequality, our alarm over inequality has intensified.
Inequality hampers economic growth, but there are spillover effects
into every other imaginable sphere of life—democracy, public health,
education, and social stability.
A consensus of empirical evidence shows that the more
concentrated an economy is, the lower its growth rate. 67 Inequality
constitutes such a formidable headwind to growth that it can arrest the
momentum of innovation in jolting the economy. 68 This is in part
because feeding the wealth gap means consigning workers to part-time
jobs with few benefits and no security. 69 Simultaneously, top earners
become closely intertwined with political leaders, from whom they
extract rents such as tax cuts. 70 Consequently, the wealth gap takes a
Sciences. See Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Angus Deaton: Consumption,
Poverty and Welfare (2015), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economicsciences/laureates/2015/advanced-economicsciences2015.pdf.
65
For one synopsis, see STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 26, at 2 (“By
2007, the year before the crisis, the top 0.1 percent of America’s households had an
income that was 220 times larger than the average of the bottom 90 percent.”).
During the financial crisis and afterward, recovery was uneven because the wealthy
tended to be invested in the financial markets (i.e., to recall Piketty’s work, capital)
and saw their losses rebound quickly, while most Americans had their net worth tied
up in housing, where pricing rebounded more slowly and unevenly. Id. at 3.
66
Id. at 5.
67
See, e.g., Philippe Aghion et al., Inequality and Economic Growth: The
Perspective of the New Growth Theories, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1615 (1999); Alesina &
Rodrik, supra note 63; Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful
for Growth?, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 600, 607, 617 (1994). For a summary of the
research, see Repetti, supra note 8, at 832-36.
68
See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE R ISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S.
STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE C IVIL WAR 605-41 (2016). Admittedly, some
inequality is inevitable and can actually propel growth. For this conventional view,
see ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY (1975).
69
For a heartbreaking anecdote, BRIAN ALEXANDER, GLASS HOUSE: THE 1%
ECONOMY AND THE SHATTERING OF THE ALL-AMERICAN TOWN (2017) (tracing the
effect on a town’s working class when its largest employer is bought out by private
equity).
70
See Committee for Economic Development of the Conference Board, Crony
Capitalism: Unhealthy Relations between Business and Government 16 (2015)
(capital gains taxes as favorable to hedge fund managers); Todd Zywicki, RentSeeking, Crony Capitalism, and the Crony Constitution, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77,
88 (2015) (arbitrary tax breaks as a product of rent-seeking); WALTER SCHEIDEL,
THE GREAT LEVELER: VIOLENCE AND THE HISTORY OF INEQUALITY FROM THE
STONE AGE TO THE TWENTY-F IRST CENTURY 51 (2017) (the rich owe their success
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toll on investments in education and health by both the government
(whose revenues are strapped by tax breaks) and individuals (whose
incomes are limited by unsteady work), which in turn inhibits longterm productivity. 71
Sure fixes to inequality include progressive taxation and
expansive social security, 72 but the outsized political influence exerted
by the wealthy constrains taxes and shreds the social safety net. 73
Instead, government leaders frequently opt for the politically
expedient alternative of loosening access to credit, so as to dull the
pain of stagnant wages and shrinking public expenditures. 74 This, in
turn, spurs consumption but creates asset bubbles, which then
precipitates other financial crises that further widen inequality. 75
Inequality and its pernicious effects are not only closely
correlated, they are mutually reinforcing. Besides democracy and
economic growth, the wealth gap also corrodes race relations and
social stability. More than any other factor, equality in wealth has the
greatest equalizing effect between Blacks and Whites. 76 The wealth
gap confines many within the minority community to inconsistent and
substandard housing 77 and also saddles them with disproportionate
court costs, 78 which inhibits the stability necessary to build wealth. 79
as much to political clout as to anything else). See also STIGLITZ, PRICE OF
INEQUALITY, supra note 26, at 39-43 (defining and describing rent-seeking).
71
Long-term productivity closely tracks education and health. See P IKETTY, supra
note 26, at 21 (“Knowledge and skill diffusion is the key to overall productivity
growth as well as the reduction of inequality both within and between countries.”).
72
See ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 179-240 (2015).
73
On the push to exert political influence, see Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission,
572 U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014); JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL R IGHT (2016). On
privatization, see STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY 176-78.
74
See RAJAN, supra note 44, at 8-9 (2010).
75
Id. at 21-45.
76
The sociologist Dalton Conley found that Blacks and Whites diverged in wealth
holdings even when other factors such as education, age, gender, and previous
income were controlled for. See DALTON CONLEY, BEING B LACK, LIVING IN THE
RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 47-49 (10th anniversary ed.
2010). However, when class measures were equalized, racial differences vanished.
Id.
77
MATTHEW DESMOND, E VICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
(2016).
78
Erik Eckholm, Court Costts Entrap Nonwhite, Poor Juvenile Offenders, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2016.
79
Even more destructive are over-policing and mass incarceration in minority
communities (which fattens the coffers of privatized prisons) and substantive and
procedural dilution of their voting rights (which consolidates political power in the
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Nor is inequality confined to racial minorities. In 2016, voting blocs
comprised of working-class majority populations unsettled a political
orthodoxy that had embraced free trade. Rightly or wrongly, this bloc
attributed its economic demise to globalization; with its support, a
populist was elected by plurality to the U.S. Presidency, and the
United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. 80 Unfortunately,
however, if comparisons are made to societies that exhibit similar
levels of inequality, these politicians are likely to disappoint voters.
By the common measure of inequality known as the Gini coefficient,
the United States is similar to Russia, Turkey, Morocco, and
Nicaragua, while the United Kingdom is on par with Bosnia,
Cambodia, Laos, Italy, Estonia, and Sri Lanka. 81 Several of these
comparators are countries whose leaders stoke fiery nationalism even
as the broader society crumbles. 82
Inequality begets inequality. It spills over “horizontally,”
exerting a corrosive influence on democracy, education, public health,
race relations, and social stability. It is also flows “vertically,” passed
down from generation to generation. A child born into a wealthy
family will have a leg up in virtually every respect, from nutrition to
education to future prospects for employment, health, and longevity. 83
Inequality’s pervasive and pernicious effects are therefore a feedback
loop reinforcing the concentration of economic and political power in
the hands of the very few at the expense of the great many.

hands of wealthy elites). See M ICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW J IM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); ARI BERMAN, GIVE US
THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA (2015).
80
Populism is a claim to speak for “the people” that is antipluralist, critical of elites,
and rooted in identity politics. See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM?
(2016). In 2017, the European Union is bracing itself for the possibility that a
populist groundswell will catapult right-wing parties to victory in the Dutch, French,
and German elections.
81
See Human Development Reports, United Nations Development Programme
(2013), http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient (search for countries
which measure at “40,” which corresponds to America’s Gini coefficient, and “36,”
which corresponds to the U.K.’s Gini coefficient).
82
Notably, the U.S. and U.K. are redeemed by their high human development
indicators; hence, they are clustered around countries rated at “very high human
development.” By focusing on inequality to the exclusion of all other factors, the
Gini coefficient only presents one dimension of society.
83
See, e.g., Kirsten Weir, Closing the health-wealth gap: Inequality in the United
States is undermining Americans’ health and longevity, say experts, AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION
(2013),
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2013/10/health-wealth.aspx; Annie Lowrey, Income
Gap, Meet the Longevity Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2014.
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Central questions

This Section only presents a snapshot of inequality’s
consequences. There are a number of other dimensions that cannot be
fully explored here. 84 To maintain focus, this Article distills the
problem of inequality to a few key questions for trusts and estates law
scholars.
First, what is the role of trusts and estates law in sustaining
inequality? The common thread among the multitude of explanations
is that laws governing the transmission of wealth are weak (e.g., the
estate tax) and lax (the use of trusts to build dynasties). 85
Second, who benefits from this legal landscape? The list is
small—the rich, of course, and their coterie of lawyers and financial
institutions—when compared against the magnitude of those on the
losing end—government, creditors, society.
A third question flows from the above two: What can trusts
and estates law do? It turns out that the most effective ways to level
out economic disparity are war, revolution, state collapse, and
plague. 86 Short of those cataclysms, governments can pursue
progressive taxation, pay parity, social security, and other policies. 87
Yet these measures are insufficient and likely to be eroded over the
long term. Legal rules governing the transmission of wealth comprise
a promising second-best solution, 88 especially since these rules have
not yet been explored for their redistributive propensity the same way
that business law has.

84

For instance, inequality has a geographic dimension. When we speak of inequality,
we might mean inequality within a country, or among countries, or among the
worldwide population. See MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART, supra note 59. Inequality
also has a temporal dimension. To properly contextualize today’s levels of
inequality, we should step back further to observe the sweep of inequality throughout
history. See SCHEIDEL, supra note 70; PIKETTY, supra note 26.
85
See, e.g., Hofri-Winogradow, supra note 35, at 537-51.
86
See Scheidel, supra note 70.
87
ATKINSON, supra note 72, at 237-39; STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note
26, at 465-90.
88
On the origins of the theory of second best, see R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster,
The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). Application
of this theory to welfare economics posits that if the Pareto-optimum (i.e., first best)
solution is unattainable because its conditions do not hold, the remaining conditions
to Pareto optimality need not be pursued. This theory has become popular in the
debate over double distortion, as a justification for departing from other Pareto
efficiency conditions (i.e.., legal rules staying out of redistribution) because of
inefficiencies in the tax system. See, e.g., Matthew Dimick, Should the Law Do
Anything About Economic Inequality?, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 60-63
(2016); Sanchirico, supra note 14, at 1017-18.
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However, we must be careful not to overstate their
redistributive propensity. As the prior Subsection demonstrates,
inequality is an affliction whose magnitude can hardly be exaggerated,
but as the remainder of this Article shows, the rules of trusts and
estates vary in their redistributive efficiency. Nonetheless, recounting
inequality’s woes helps to counter the moral force of testamentary
freedom as an organizing principle for trusts and estates and also to
reorient the field around an equally pressing imperative:
redistribution.
III.

REDISTRIBUTION BY RULES IN TRUSTS AND ESTATES

Inequality’s effects are pervasive and pernicious. Yet the legal
system governing wealth does not adequately prevent inequality at the
wealth generation end (business law) or the wealth transmission end
(wealth transfer taxes). Therefore, we must supplement by turning to
the legal rules within trusts and estates. This Section organizes the
possibilities for doing so. First, it considers a hybrid system that blends
elements of private law with the tax system—specifically, the rule
against perpetuities, which interfaces with estate taxes. Next, this
Section examines three groups of rules that transfer wealth between
private parties, without the regulatory arm of the state. Broadly
construed, these rules affect wealth distribution between trusts and
creditors (e.g., spendthrift and asset protection trusts), between
beneficiaries and trustees (e.g., fiduciary duties), and among
beneficiaries (e.g., abatement, ademption, cy pres, and execution
formalities).
Before we proceed, however, a few caveats must be laid bare.
First, this Article takes a welfare economics approach that analyzes
the effect of rules on the well-being of individuals, with priority given
to wealth equality. 89 Under this view, redistribution is accomplished
by transferring wealth from the rich to the poor. This is because the
marginal utility of increased wealth is greater for the poor than the
89

For the pillars of welfare economics, see, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY (1973); INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992) [hereinafter SEN,
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED]. Some scholars have argued that in gauging well-being,
subjective notions of happiness and justice should not matter at all. See, e.g., JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Social Unity and Primary Goods, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982);
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY;
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 16; SEN, INEQUALITY
REEXAMINED.
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rich—put differently, the poor (who begin with little wealth) value
slight increases in wealth more than the wealthy (who begun with vast
wealth). 90 Wealth transfers from rich to poor raise overall social
welfare, though not necessarily overall wealth.
Second, welfare economics governs this Article’s conception
of efficiency. Faced with a choice between two regimes for
redistribution, we settle on that which distributes wealth most
efficiently. “Efficiency” typically refers to either Pareto efficiency,
where no one is made worse off if someone is made better off, or
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, where those made better off can compensate
those made worse off. 91 Pareto efficiency is rare in the real world, so
most economists and legal scholars settle for Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency. 92 But as between two legal regimes, Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency can be indeterminate—that is, the Kaldor-Hicks test could
justify going from regime A to regime B as much as going from regime
B to regime A. 93 Yet if wealth distribution is factored in, the regime
that distributes wealth more evenly will prevail. 94 Such a result
satisfies distributive efficiency, rather than Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
Finally, this Section aims to re-conceptualize trusts and
estates’ legal rules as tools for redistribution. These rules inevitably
pit some groups against others (e.g., trusts versus creditors,
beneficiaries versus trustees); yet the redistributive approach does not
mean that certain groups will always win. Empirical questions
regarding relative wealth can help to sort through the rules. More
fundamentally, this Article adopts approaches from law and
economics, which has vigorously debated the redistributive potential
of legal rules in general. 95 By doing so, this Article attempts to breathe
new life into old debates within trusts and estates. The examples in the
following Subsections are starting points for what will hopefully
become a broader effort to reimagine the field.
90

See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 990-92 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare].
91
Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, Book Review, 112 YALE L.J. 1511,
1516-17 (2003).
92
Id. at 1517-19.
93
This is because the winners in the change of a A to B could compensate the losers,
but if the situation were reversed, the winners in the change of B to A could just as
easily compensate the losers. See id. at 1076 n.1013.
94
See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 90, at 1076 n.1016
(“[I]t may be indeterminate whether regime A, in which Jack gets $100 and Jill gets
$50, or regime B, in which each gets $75, is more efficient, but a social welfare
function . . . would produce a clear choice. In this example, plausible social welfare
functions would ordinarily favor the more equal distribution. . .”).
95
See supra note 14.
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A. Private-Rule/Tax-and-Transfer Hybrid: The Rule Against
Perpetuities
1.

Background

Redistribution can occur either by the public tax-and-transfer
system (i.e., taxes) or by private law (i.e., legal rules). 96 Yet an
intermediate scheme exists within the dichotomy: a hybrid that has
elements of both private law and the tax-and-transfer system. For
instance, one side of the redistribution scheme (the taking or the
giving) might be accomplished through legal rules, while the other
might be achieved through taxes or other state action. 97 Examples
include eminent domain, where local government takes property from
landowners, and voucher systems, where federal or state governments
convey in-kind benefits to recipients. 98
In trusts and estates, the rule against perpetuities (“RAP”) fits
within this hybrid model. The RAP is a vestige of common law that
affects transactions between private parties. The rule states that “a
contingent future interest must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years
after the expiration of some life in being when the interest was
created.” 99 In the trusts context, the RAP limits the vesting of assets
in remote contingent beneficiaries. 100 A paradigmatic example is a
trust that devises property to a succession of life estate holders—e.g.,
the settlor’s child for life, then the child’s children for their lives—and
then the principal to the contingent remainders—e.g., the settlor’s
grandchildren. 101 If the contingent remaindermen are too remote, the
trust effectively terminates at the expiration of the last life estate. 102
Such a trust interfaces with the tax-and-transfer system
through the estate tax and generation-skipping transfer (“GST”) tax,
which taxes transfers to a settlor’s grandchildren. However, the law
also includes an exclusion amount that has swelled in recent years by
96

Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient, supra note 14.
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution through Private Law, 91
MINN. L. REV. 326, 333 (2006).
98
Id. at 380, 390-96.
99
Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 1303, 1304 (2003).
100
At its heart, the RAP balances the freedom of the current generation against the
freedom of future generations to control property. Thomas P. Gallanis, The Rule
Against Perpetuities and the Law Commission’s Flawed Philosophy, 59 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 284 (2000) [hereinafter Gallanis, RAP].
101
Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 99, at 1312.
102
Id. at 1313 n.36.
97
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virtue of indexing for inflation and tax reform. 103 The exclusion
amount for all gift, estate, and GST taxes was $1 million in 2010, $5
million in 2011, and $5.45 million in 2016; for 2017, it is $5.49
million. 104 Thus, a settlor could evade taxes by creating a trust that
would last as long as possible, devising $5.49 million (or its inflationadjusted equivalent) to a succession of life estates and then a set of
contingent remainders. Such a trust would be taxed only when it
terminated, and termination is governed by the perpetuities period
under state law.
In recent decades, states have altered or outright repealed the
RAP. Some jurisdictions have adopted a wait-and-see approach that
permits waiting for some period to determine whether contingent
remainders might vest, effectively extending a trust for at least that
long. 105 Other states have adopted the more explicit Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities, which sets a fixed perpetuities period
ranging from 90 to 1,000 years after creation. 106 Most recently, some
states have abolished the RAP outright. 107 The ensuing trusts created
under such regimes can last in perpetuity, while also avoiding estate
and GST taxes. 108 Such trusts are called “perpetual trusts” or “dynasty
trusts.”
2.

103

Redistributive reforms

See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act,
Pub.L. 111–312, H.R. 4853, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010).
104
That’s New – Estate and Gift Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/whats-new-estateand-gift-tax.
105
See, e.g., 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6104 (2006); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2131.08(C) (Supp.
2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.27, §501 (2002); Restatement (Second) of Property
(Donative Transfer) § 1.3.
106
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14-2901 (2009); Cal. Prob. Code §§21200 et seq.
(West Supp. 2016); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§15-11-1101 et seq. (West Supp. 2016); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§45a-490-496 (West Supp. 2016). See also Lawrence W.
Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the
90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (1988); Jessie Dukeminier, The
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 1023 (1987).
107
See, e.g., 37 Idaho Code §55-111 (2008); S.D. Codified Laws § 43-5-8 (2017).
108
In fact, empirical evidence suggests that perpetual trusts—and abolition of the
RAP—arose in response to the GST tax. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M.
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis
of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005) [hereinafter Sitkoff &
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds].
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Defending the RAP from the current onslaught is a natural—
and efficient—starting point for redressing wealth inequality within
trusts and estates. There are a number of ways to bolster the RAP,
ranging from cautious to sweeping. Straightforward solutions include
taxing dynasty trusts, 109 legislating dynasty trusts out of existence, 110
and reinstating the RAP so as to abolish the inter-state race to the
bottom. 111 Admittedly, these may be politically infeasible because
they require drastic legislative action. A more moderate change is to
give courts the ability to tinker with dynasty trusts, such as a cy pres
power to modify or terminate trusts that do not increase net social
welfare. 112 More cautious still, reforms can target the measuring lives
of the RAP—for instance, limiting beneficiaries to no more than two
generations beyond the grantor, 113 rather than resorting to the arcane
malpractice trap of “lives in being.” 114 Of course, additional empirical
and technical analysis must be conducted to settle on the best
approach.
Overall, the RAP should occupy a central role in our
redistribution project. A quick glimpse of the opposing sides of
perpetuities reform reveals why. Dynasty trusts are roundly
condemned by most commentators. 115 Advocates of the rule’s repeal
109

Joel C. Dobris, Undoing Repeal of the rule Against Perpetuities: Federal and
State Tools for Breaking Dynasty Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2537, 2541-42
(2006).
110
Id. at 2542.
111
Id. at 2545-46. On the jurisdictional competition to eliminate the RAP, see
Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule against
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003); Sitkoff &
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds, supra note 108.
112
See Dobris, supra 109, at 2546, n.42; Ronald Chester, Modification and
Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet
Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697, 724 (2001).
113
This approach to revitalize the RAP is reflected in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY, § 27.1 (2011), which adopts the recommendations in Daniel M.
Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?, 56 MICH. L. REV.
683 (1958); Thomas P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 513, 549, 559-560 (2003).
114
On the rule’s technical difficulties, see e.g., G. Graham Waite, Let's Abolish the
Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 93, 97 (1992); Keith L. Butler, Long
Live the Dead Hand: A Case for Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities in
Washington, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1237, 1238 (2000); Paul G. Haskell, A Proposal for
a Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. REV. 545, 545
(1988). Of course, if perpetuities reform is not animated by the bar’s fear of
malpractice (and it is not), then this reform will not forestall the RAP’s erosion.
115
See, e.g., Joel C. Dobrs, The Death of the Rule against Perpetuities, Or the RAP
Has No Friends, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000); Sterk, Jurisdictional
Competition, supra note 111; Dukeminier & James E. Krier, supra note 99.
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tend to be a much smaller group of either financial institutions or estate
planning attorneys. 116 Substantively, however, there is in the RAP a
confluence of factors not found elsewhere in the field.
First, as a mode of redistribution, the RAP is particularly
efficient. The RAP affects the wealthy—those settlors who can create
a dynasty trust with the requisite corpus of $5.49 million. Further, the
RAP singles out settlors with dynastic aspirations. 117 The RAP also
interacts with wealth transfer taxes. This nexus permits the state to be
involved; as illustrated above with regulators in business law, the state
has more information than a court regarding the macroeconomic
effects of distribution. All in all, the RAP facilitates a transfer of
wealth from the very rich (when it forces a trust to terminate and be
subjected to estate and transfer taxes) to the poor (by virtue of
distribution in the tax system).
Second, because the RAP represents a hybrid model that aligns
closely with estate and GST taxes, the distortionary effect of the rule
on the parties involved is not as severe as a rule which operates wholly
outside the tax system. The “double distortion” argument holds that a
rule which redistributes income compounds the economic distortions
already present in the tax system. 118 Therefore, legal rules should aim
for efficiency, leaving redistribution to the tax system. 119 The
counterarguments challenge double distortion’s premises and posit
that deficient tax systems must be supplemented with redistributive

116

See Grayson M. P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40
Pepp. L. Rev. 1291 (2013); Waite, supra note 114.
117
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND INHERITANCE LAW 14 (2009) (“some of the most arcane and mysterious rules
find their explanation, ultimately, in their impact on dynastic wealth”); Hirsch &
Wang, supra note 6, at 33 (“more extensive powers of serial distribution . . . create
an opportunity for the testator to satisfy her dynastic ambitions”); McCouch, supra
note 116, at 1300 (“promotional literature [for perpetual trusts] is replete with thinly
veiled appeals to settlors' vanity and dynastic aspirations”).
118
This argument is most closely associated with Professors Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell. See Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient, supra
note 14. However, it descends from a line of political philosophy traceable to John
Rawls. See RAWLS, supra note 89, at 245 (“[I]nheritance is permissible provided
that the resulting inequalities are to the advantage of the least fortunate and
compatible with liberty and fair equality of opportunity . . . [F]air equality of
opportunity means a certain set of institutions that assures similar chances of
education and culture for persons similarly motivated . . .”).
119
Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient, supra note 14, at 66768.
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legal rules. 120 For our current purposes, we can reduce double
distortion to its essential argument: the tax system is the most efficient
way to address inequality, and legal rules are inefficient when they
attempt to do the same. 121 Yet when the tax system departs from
optimal efficiency, the ancillary legal rules no longer produce efficient
results if they remain in their optimal states. 122 By extension, legal
rules must assume the distributive mantle (and therefore depart from
the efficient state of eschewing distribution) to correct for flaws in the
tax system. To give a concrete example, we might say that
redistribution in trusts and estates is best accomplished by a
combination of estate, gift, and GST taxes. We might also say that the
balances struck by the RAP should not contemplate distributive ends
whatsoever. 123 Yet when the tax system fails to transfer wealth from
the rich to the poor, 124 the legal rule has to step in to offset that
inefficiency in the tax system. 125 Hence, the RAP must stand as a
bulwark against dynasty trusts, to compel their termination and
taxation at some point. 126
Third, much of the wealth held in trusts is capital—financial
instruments, equity in enterprises, and real estate. 127 To the extent that
a differential in capital and income drives inequality, 128 unlocking

120
See, e.g., David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All Of) Labor, Income,
Consumption, Capital Income, and Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355 (2015); Sanchirico,
supra note 14; Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 14; Dimick, supra note 88.
121
This is more systematically explored by Kaplow and Shavell in a series of works
that frames fairness and welfare as mutually exclusive. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 16; Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 90.
122
See Dimick, supra note 88, at 63.
123
Instead, it should focus on balancing the interests of current and future
beneficiaries. But this is far from clear. See Gallanis, RAP, supra note 100, at 292
(economic, rather than normative arguments, best support the RAP).
124
E.g., because legislative capture allows tax exclusions to be raised and rates to be
reduced year after year.
125
I.e., inefficient from a welfare economics perspective because the system raises
overall inequality. Distributive efficiency is distinguishable from efficiency in
general, which “denote[s] that allocation of resources in which value is maximized.”
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (7th ed. 2007).
126
This complementary relationship between the RAP and taxes is similar to that
between income and consumption taxes, which his animated much of the double
distortion debate. See Gamage, supra note 120.
127
See John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United
States?, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 1069, 1072 (2007) (“the characteristic trust asset has ceased
to be ancestral land and has become instead a portfolio of marketable securities”).
128
PIKETTY, supra note 26. Piketty’s findings have been criticized for not
sufficiently distinguishing between capital and land. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, New
Theoretical Perspectives on the Distribution of Income and Wealth Among
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assets sequestered in trust for taxation or productive use can at least
allow some of the assets to be redistributed. 129
There are, however, potential criticisms of the RAP as a
redistribution mechanism. One line of criticism is inherent to hybrid
schemes generally—the two sides of the scheme, the “rich” and the
“needy,” never directly interact but only deal with the state. 130 There
is no fostering of relationships, as there is in a legal rule that affects
two private parties. 131 Further, the efficacy of the scheme depends as
much on the robustness of estate taxes as on the perpetuities period;
where tax exemptions are large and tax rates slim, the redistributive
effects of the RAP will be hampered. Finally, from a practical
perspective, upon the termination of a dynasty trust, beneficiaries may
simply redeposit the assets into other trusts. 132 Nonetheless, even if all
of these criticisms ring true, limiting the duration of dynasty trusts will
enable the generation of some tax revenue, which can then be
redistributed. Additionally, the RAP also must not be analyzed in
isolation; it is the RAP in conjunction with asset protection trusts that
wrecks the most havoc upon wealth equality. 133
B. Purely Private Legal Rules
Purely private legal rules constitute another mode for
redistribution. For this, trusts and estates is a particularly fertile
realm—here the law is comprised of a myriad of rules. This
Subsection focuses on three groups of rules: redistribution from

Individuals, in INEQUALITY AND GROWTH: PATTERNS AND POLICY 2-3 (Kaushik
Basu & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2016).
129
In some sense, this is a variation of the old justification for the RAP that it keeps
trust property in the stream of commerce, to be put to productive use rather than to
fester. See Garrett Moritz, Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities,
116 Harv. L. Rev. 2588, 2597 (2003); Waite, supra note 114, at 96. This argument
assumes that “unlocked” assets will be put to productive use rather than deposited
in trust and, furthermore, that productive use directly benefits the poor rather than,
say, the assets being pledged as collateral for loans to develop land, which then
widens inequality.
130
Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 97, at 390-92.
131
See id. at 392.
132
Scott Andrew Shepard, A Uniform Perpetuities Reform Act, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 89, 103-04 (2013) (“If we assume minimal competence on the part of
the beneficiaries (or their attorneys and financial advisors), then we can expect them
simply to redeposit that res in trusts indistinguishable from the trust just concluded-in no way diminishing the dynasty family's aggregate wealth.”).
133
Dobris, supra note 109, at 2539 (“the toxic combo is perpetual trusts and asset
protection trusts”).
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settlors and beneficiaries to creditors; redistribution between trustees
to beneficiaries; and redistribution among beneficiaries. 134
1.

Beneficiaries/settlors versus creditors: Spendthrift and
asset protection trusts
a.

Background

Spendthrift and asset protection trusts apportion wealth
between settlors and beneficiaries on one hand and creditors on the
other. A spendthrift trust—or, more precisely, a trust with the
“disabling restraint” of a spendthrift provision 135—prevents the sale,
assignment, and alienation of a beneficiary’s interest in a trust. 136 The
restraint bars immediate consumption of the interest either by the
beneficiary selling the interest for a lump sum or by a creditor levying
execution against the interest. Thus, if a plaintiff has successfully sued
a trust beneficiary for sexually assaulting her child and broadcasting
the assault over the Internet, the plaintiff cannot reach the trust assets
to satisfy the judgment if the trust contains a spendthrift provision. 137
Ostensibly, the settlor of the trust inserted spendthrift language to
insulate the assets, perhaps because the settlor did not trust the
beneficiary with unfettered access.
If, however, the trust were self-settled—created by a settlor to
shield assets from his own creditors—then the settlor and the
beneficiary are one and the same. 138 Now the creditor is a creditor to
the settlor. A self-settled spendthrift trust is more commonly known
as an asset protection trust (“APT”). American laws were initially
reluctant to recognize APTs since the notion of a debtor creating a
vehicle to protect assets from his creditors smacks of fraudulent

134

Some of these legal rules also intersect with the tax system. For instance, transfers
to APTs might trigger tax implications. See Karen E. Boxx, Gray’s Ghost—A
Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1195, 1241-51 (2000);
Randall J. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to “Asset Protection” Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV.
987, 1005-08 (1999). In this sense, these rules are hybrid modes of redistribution,
and the same considerations explored above will apply. However, the remainder of
this Subsection explores the private dimensions of these rules—that is, only
redistribution among the parties affected by the rules.
135
Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts].
136
See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 417-20 (4th
ed. 2010); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(b) [hereinafter UTC].
137
Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A. 2d 410 (NH 2001).
138
See Boxx, supra note 134, at 1198.

4/26/2017 11:29 AM

SUBMISSION COPY

2017]

ASYMMETRIES IN WEALTH

29

conveyance. 139 Yet as offshore jurisdictions validated APTs and assets
started flowing abroad, American states began to follow suit. 140 This
precipitated a “race to the bottom” for trust assets and trust
administration similar to the competition for corporate charters in state
corporate law. 141
A statute that recognizes APTs can thwart creditor recovery by
narrowing the fraudulent transfer exception, 142 shortening the statute
of limitations on claims, 143 and barring enforcement of foreign
judgments. 144 Thus, if promoters of a telemarketing Ponzi scheme
were sued by the Federal Trade Commission, the promoters could
transfer their assets to an offshore APT organized under the permissive
laws of the Cook Islands, and the Commission would have limited
recourse. 145 The promoters’ assets would lie beyond the reach of a
U.S. court because they rest in a jurisdiction unwilling to tap trust
assets to satisfy foreign judgments. 146
Notably, spendthrift provisions and APTs are subject to
conditions. Both sets of legal rules feature exceptions protecting the
claims of certain creditors—typically, spouses seeking alimony and
children seeking support. 147 In some states, the exceptions for
spendthrift trusts are expanded to claims by providers of necessities
and also of services to protect trust beneficiaries’ interests. 148 APTs,
because they are inherently more reprehensible, permit additional
carve-outs. These include prohibitions against fraudulent transfers and
requirements of irrevocability. 149
b.
139

Redistributive reforms

UTC § 505 cmt. See generally 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156, at 164-86 (4th ed. 1987). This
view is still reflected in the Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code. See
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 58(2) & cmt. b (2003); UTC § 505(a)(2).
140
See Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 60, at 1047-55.
141
Id.
142
E.g., by requiring that the settlor was insolvent when the creditor claim arose. See
International Trust Act (1984) § 13(B) (1996) (Cook Islands).
143
Id. at § 13(B)3(b).
144
Id. at § 13(D).
145
I.e., contempt sanctions. See Federal Trade Commission v. Affordable Media,
LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999); Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra
note 60, at 1102-03.
146
See Affordable Media, 179 F.3d.
147
See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 503(B)(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §
59(a). These limitations are common to the general scheme of trusts and estates.
148
See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 503(B)(2); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §
59(b).
149
See 12 Del. Code §§ 3570, 3571.
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For spendthrift provisions and APTs, the key to redistribution
lies in their exceptions and conditions—which, if rigorous, prevent
settlors from fully shielding their assets. Enabling recovery by certain
creditors such as spouses and children operates to shift wealth from
beneficiaries and settlors. So, too, does a hard and fast requirement
that spendthrift trusts be irrevocable. The most embattled exception,
though, is fraudulent transfer: under fraudulent conveyance law,
transfers made to hinder creditor claims can be set aside. 150 While this
law has traditionally covered both actual and constructive fraud by
debtors, 151 at least one state now requires creditors to prove actual
fraud. 152 Shoring up the fraudulent transfer exception to encompass
constructive fraud by grantors helps to shift wealth to creditors. The
exception can also be fortified by recognizing the claims of both
current and future creditors. 153
Either way, fraud is still difficult to prove, as most corporate
practitioners can attest. 154 This shortcoming extends to trusts and
estates as well. 155 Moreover, fraudulent conveyance had stood for
centuries as the doctrinal justification for barring self-settled
spendthrift trusts, 156 the view being that it was beyond the pale for a
debtor to thwart creditors by creating a trust for his benefit. 157 The
advent of foreign, and then domestic, APTs chipped away at that

150

U.F.C.A. ss 4, 6, 7, 7A U.L.A. 474, 507, 509 (1918); U.F.T.A. ss 4, 5, 7A U.L.A.
652-53, 657 (1984). This is espoused in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act of
1917 (“UFCA”) and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act of 1984 (“UFTA”), which
has supplanted the UFCA in many states.
151
See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act §§ 4(a)(1), 4(a)(2).
152
See Alaska Stat. §§ 34.40.010.
153
The UFTA already does this. See UFTA § 4(a); Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts,
supra note 60, at 1045. However, some states limit the exception’s efficacy by
undercutting the statute of limitations for claims against trusts. See, e.g., Alaska Stat.
§ 34.40.110(d)(2); Boxx, supra note 134, at 1223-24.
154
Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 60, at 1046-47. But see Jeffrey A.
Schoenblum, In Search of a Unifying Principle for Article V of the Uniform Trust
Code: A Response to Professor Danforth, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2609, 2611 (2006)
(“As long as fraudulent conveyance laws are enforced and not easily evaded, the
settlor will not be able to impair creditors’ access to the trust assets.”).
155
See Boxx, supra note 134, at 1241 (“[F]raudulent conveyance claim is difficult
for a plaintiff to establish, and, if the transfer falls short of the definition of fraudulent
conveyance, the legislation has harmed the creditor by giving the debtor a relatively
painless way to put assets beyond the reach of the creditor.”).
156
That is, if we trace the roots of fraudulent conveyance (as many commentators
do) to the English Statute of Elizabeth, enacted in 1570. See 5 Debtor-Creditor Law
æ 22.03 (Theodore Eisenberg ed., 1999).
157
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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modicum of propriety as states adopted a series of mechanisms
curtailing the ability of creditors to recover. 158
This should not imply that pro-creditor reforms are out of
reach. Because APTs provoke uncommonly sharp ire, proposals to
rein them in do not suffer from lack of imagination. Those proposals
include Constitutional challenges to APTs, 159 as well as federal
reforms to bankruptcy 160 and Medicaid, 161 which would pre-empt state
APT law. More fanciful still are calls to criminalize transfers to
offshore APTs and to limit these trusts to jurisdictions bound by treaty
to cooperate with the United States. 162 These proposals are unlikely to
transpire since they require tremendous political will on the part of
federal and state legislators, who are already prone to capture. More
realistic are acts of judicial resistance within the bounds of existing
law. 163 In this regard, one viable alternative is for judges to liberally
utilize contempt sanctions for settlors who refuse to turn over assets
sequestered in APTs to satisfy judgment. 164
Rather than put up procedural barriers to spendthrift trusts,
another way forward is to expand recovery for additional subsets of
creditors. Indeed, this may be an important first step in the exploration
of the distributive efficiency of spendthrift trust exceptions, because it
forces us to consider the relative wealth of the parties involved.
As in business law, trusts encounter two types of creditors:
contract creditors and tort creditors. The treatment of these two groups
is not parallel. In corporate law, a creditor who has secured judgment
against an undercapitalized enterprise can “pierce the corporate veil”
by going directly to the equity holder to satisfy judgment. The creditor

158

See supra notes 142-44, 152 and accompanying text. See also John K. Eason,
Policy, Logic, and Persuasion in the Evolving Realm of Trust Asset Protection, 27
Cardozo L. Rev. 2621, 2655-61 (2006); Gingiss, supra note 134, at 1008-12.
159
See Boxx, supra note 134, at 1230-31 (Contract Clause), 1208-10 (Full Faith and
Credit Clause, for recognition of out-of-state judgments); U.S. Const. art. I, § 10,
cl.1.
160
See Eason, supra note 158, at 2668-70 (exploring the eventually unsuccessful
proposal, as part of the debate surrounding the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, to cap APTs at $125,000).
161
Id. at 2679-82 (speculating on whether the Medicaid program will eventually
limit the ability of applicants to utilize APTs in the qualification process).
162
See Gingiss, supra note 134, at 1008.
163
See Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101
Mich. L. Rev. 1791, n.45 (2003) (“[P]ublic choice problems might make it easier to
use the courts than the legislature for redistribution. Certainly, recent rounds of tax
legislation have not been an edifying spectacle.”).
164
But see Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 60, at 1102-03 (contempt
sanctions have limited long-term effect).
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might be seeking recovery for an unpaid bill 165 or a tort injury. 166 A
successful case can strip the limited liability protection for enterprise
equity holders.
Empirical studies show that veil piercing cases are more
successful if brought by contract creditors than tort creditors. 167 This
may be for practical reasons. Courts tend to permit veil piercing when
the facts indicate misrepresentation, and misrepresentation is easier to
substantiate with a prior course of dealing that leaves a document
trail. 168 By contrast, the tort setting does not implicate
misrepresentation. This empirical finding belies strong normative and
theoretical arguments to the contrary. Tort creditors should be more
successful precisely because there is no course of dealing through
which they can extract safeguards. 169 Instead, the interaction is
typically unexpected and wholly involuntary, so there is no chance to
demand a premium from a tortfeasor-beneficiary in exchange for any
limitations on recovery. 170
The absence of recourse for involuntary creditors is decried by
detractors and supporters of spendthrift trusts alike. 171 Bankruptcy,
corporate, and tort law reflect similar criticisms. 172 Nevertheless,
legislatures are inconsistent when they enact spendthrift trusts; some
jurisdictions protect involuntary creditors, while others do not. 173 An
unequivocal exception would serve as a mode of redistribution.
The distributive efficiency of a tort creditor exception depends
on the relative wealth of tortfeasor-beneficiaries and tort victimcreditors. Decades ago, it was charged that spendthrift trusts “permit
165

See, e.g., Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1991).
See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (NY 1966)
167
See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1044 (1991).
168
Id. at 1064-65, 1068-70.
169
See Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 Cardozo L. Rev.
2685, 2694 (2006) [hereinafter Hirsch, Fear Not the APT]; Hirsch, Spendthrift
Trusts, supra note 135, at 77-79.
170
Thus, in the corporate setting, scholars have argued for unlimited shareholder
liability for tort claims, but so far, lawmakers have not been persuaded. See Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1916-23 (1991).
171
See, e.g., Boxx, supra note 134, at 1257-59; Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra
note 60, at 1073; Hirsch, Fear Not the APT, supra note 169, at 2692-94; Hirsch,
Spendthrift Trusts, supra note 135, at 77-79.
172
E.g., Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound, 93 B.U. L. REV. 89 (2013); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 89 (1985); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 170; Lynn M. Lopucki, The
Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 45-47 (1996).
173
See Eason, supra note 158, at 2661-62.
166
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children of rich men to live in luxury and debt.” 174 While the dollar
amounts protected by spendthrift trusts are hard to pin down, it is
estimated that that spendthrift trusts, APTs, and trusts in general hold
astronomical wealth for their beneficiaries. 175 On the other hand,
victims of environmental torts—and perhaps even intentional and
negligence torts—tend to be drawn from poor (and minority)
communities. 176 On average, then, settlors and beneficiaries of these
trusts may well be wealthier than tort creditors.
These empirical questions must be answered with precision for
the tort creditor exception to work. In fact, empirical “indeterminacy”
is a major obstacle to the enhancement of social welfare by way of
legal rules. 177 However, once these questions are answered, the
exception may be refined. For instance, if victims of environmental or
strict liability torts tend to be uniformly poor, then perhaps the
exception to spendthrift and asset protection trusts should extend only
to creditors pursuing satisfaction of judgment for those torts. 178 In any
event, a tort creditor exception is a good place to start. As scholarship
develops on redistributive potential of piercing the spendthrift trust,
analysis can widen to exceptions for contract creditors. However,
empirical and theoretical inquiries will be more complicated because,
among other things, contract creditors might be more economically
diverse.
2.

Beneficiaries versus trustees: Fiduciary duties

So far, this Section has contemplated legal rules primarily
through the lens of distributive efficiency. Yet there are many rules in
trusts and estates where the analysis is fraught with other concerns that
174
Willard M. Bushman, The (In)Validity of Spendthrift Trusts, 47 ORE. L. REV. 304,
312 (1968).
175
See Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It’s Time to Codify the Compromise,
72 NEB. L. REV. 179, 182 n.16 (1993); Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 60,
at 1036.
176
See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Racism and Invisible Communities, 96 W.
VA. L. REV. 1037 (1994); Tsachi Keren-Paz, An Inquiry into the Merits of
Redistribution through Tort Law: Rejecting the Claim of Randomness, 16 CAN. J.L.
& JUR. 91, 94-95 (2003); Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV.
785, 799-800 (1990).
177
See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 90, at 1375-76.
178
Similarly, in a comparative negligence regime, where defendants lose if they are
careless, it might be hypothesized that tortfeasors are comparatively better off than
tort victims. After all, tortfeasors lose if they are careless, and those with a lower
marginal utility for damages (i.e., the rich) are likelier to be careless than those with
a greater marginal utility for damages (the poor).
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muddle the redistributive calculation. One such concern is fairness,
which includes notions of justice, equity, rights, and related concepts
but not social welfare. 179 To explore the intersections and divergences
of fairness and welfare, this Subsection evaluates the redistributive
propensities (and limitations) of fiduciary duties, which govern
relations between beneficiaries and trustees.
a.

Background

Fiduciary duties determine the legal boundaries of agents’
behavior toward their principals. The officer-shareholder relationship
in a corporation, for example, is an agency relationship where officers
are bound by fiduciary duties. 180 So, too, are the partnerpartnership, 181 investor-investment adviser, 182 and executor-estate
relationships. 183 For trusts in particular, fiduciary duties evolved to
protect beneficiaries from trustees. As in all agency situations, the
interests of beneficiaries and trustees can be misaligned. Distinctive
features about trusts amplify the potential for trustees to behave badly:
trustees hold legal but not beneficial title in trust property, which may
lead them to pursue imprudent investment strategies, while
beneficiaries often lack the capacity or knowledge to be able to
monitor trustees. 184
Over time, agency law devised a number of duties for agents—
specifically, the duties of (1) loyalty, (2) care, (3) good faith and fair
dealing, (4) disclosure, (5) accounting and maintenance of the
principal’s funds, (6) good conduct and obedience, and (7)
indemnification. 185 Of these, only loyalty, care, and, depending on the
jurisdiction, sometimes good faith and disclosure count as fiduciary

179

See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 16, at 38-45;
Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 90, at 999-1005.
180
See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01
(1994); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984).
181
See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21; REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 404(b), (c)
[hereinafter RUPA].
182
See Investment Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6; SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
183
See, e.g., In re Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977).
184
See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 621 (2004) [hereinafter Sitkoff, Agency Costs Theory]; Lusina Ho, Trusts: The
Essentials, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST 17-20 (Lionel Smith ed. 2013).
185
See J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND
THE LLC: THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (8th ed., 2011).
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duties,186 obliging the agent “to act primarily for the benefit of” the
principal. 187 Within this subset, the paramount fiduciary duty is
loyalty, described as “stricter than the morals of the market place,”
“the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,” “unbending and
inveterate,” and uncompromisingly rigid. 188
In trusts, elements of the duty of loyalty constitute a
“mandatory core” that cannot be eviscerated by contract. 189 Most
prominently, Section 1008 of the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) bars
an exculpation clause that (1) “relieves the trustees of liability for
breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to
the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries” 190 or (2)
“was inserted as the result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship to the settlor.” 191 The first prohibition, on
exculpation for bad faith and recklessness, is reflected in corporate
law. 192 The second prohibition essentially requires that exculpations
be made in good faith. 193 Finally, Section 1008 compels exculpations
(3) be “fair under the circumstances” and “adequately communicated
to the settlor.” 194 This third mandate, of fairness and adequate
disclosure, also has analogs in business law. 195 At its core, it embodies
our tastes and preferences for fairness in fiduciary law. 196 After all, it
might well be Kaldor-Hicks efficient for a trustee to compensate the
principal for a waiver by lowering fees or agreeing to take stewardship
of complex assets. Yet the UTC refuses to reduce exculpations to an
efficient-transaction analysis. Thus, even though a libertarian
186

See HYNES & LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 185. Sometimes good faith is subsumed
within other duties, and sometimes it is separated out as a standalone duty. Cf. AM.
LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (good faith is part of
the duty of care); RUPA 404(d) (good faith as separate duty); Stone v. Ritter, 911
A.2d 362, 370 (Del.) (duty of loyalty encompasses good faith).
187
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 13, comment a.
188
Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 464.
189
See UTC §§ 1008, 105(b)(10); John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law
of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1105, 1123 (2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory
Rules].
190
UTC § 1008(a)(1)
191
UTC § 1008(a)(2).
192
See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 102(b)(7) [hereinafter DGCL].
193
See Langbein, supra note 189, at 1123.
194
UTC § 1008(b).
195
See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 390 (agent acting on own account must
still deal fairly and disclose); RUPA § 404(d) (partner must discharge duties
consistent with good faith and fair dealing); DGCL § 144(a) (material facts of a
conflicted transaction must disclosed, and transaction must be fair).
196
See Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, Review Essay, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1992 (2002).
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revolution has swept through business law to render most fiduciary
duties waivable, 197 in trusts the duty of loyalty has never fully
succumbed to contractarianism. 198 And the requirements of good faith,
fairness, and disclosure form a buffer against contractarian creep. 199
We should not lose perspective. Viewed against the grand
scheme of trusts law, Section 1008 is more an anomaly than a buffer.
The libertarian revolution has permeated trusts as thoroughly as it has
business law; the core fiduciary duties of loyalty, 200 impartiality, 201
and care 202 have become mere defaults that can be modified by
settlors. 203 This is not surprising. If loyalty, the pinnacle of the
fiduciary standard, can be broadly (though not completely) waived,
then lesser duties can be obliterated. 204 In corporate law, for example,
this means that an agent’s duty of care is not simply the reasonable
man standard from negligence law; to prevail on breach of care, a
plaintiff needs to prove conduct somewhere in the vicinity of gross
negligence 205 and also to overcome procedural obstacles in the
business judgment rule 206—assuming that charter does not insulate
agents from breach of care. 207

197

See RUPA § 103(b)(3) (partnership agreement may authorize act that would
breach duty of loyalty and may identify acts that do not violate loyalty, if certain
conditions are satisfied), 103(b)(5) (partnership agreement may prescribe standards
to measure good faith); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (limited liability
company agreement can eliminate fiduciary duties except acts that constitute bad
faith or violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing); DGCL § 102(b)(7)
(corporate charter can eliminate fiduciary duty except for the duty of loyalty and
good faith, among other things). In trusts, self-dealing cannot be cured by co-trustee
approval. See MC GOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at 513. However, it is acceptable
if authorized by the terms of the trust, approved by the court, or consented to by the
beneficiary. UTC § 802(b); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt. c.
198
See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 192.
199
Elsewhere in trusts law, there are also duties to inform. E.g., the UTC mandates
certain disclosures of trustees that cannot be waived. See id. at §§ 105(b). See also
T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595 (2007).
200
UTC § 802(a); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959).
201
UTC § 803; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 232 (1959).
202
UTC § 804; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
203
Or, more precisely, these duties are not designated as mandatory by the UTC,
which supports the conclusion that they are waivable. See Langbein, Mandatory
Rules, supra note 192, at 1122.
204
We also trust agents to be careful more than we trust them to be loyal. See
POSNER, supra note 125, at 441.
205
See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996).
206
See In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Deriv. Litig., 2009 WL 481906 (Del. Ch.
2009).
207
See DGCL 102(b)(7)
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In trusts, the duty of care takes a slightly different turn. A
trustee must still administer the trust “as a prudent person would,”
exercising “reasonable care, skill, and caution.” 208 However, there are
additional overlays for “prudence” in the investment of trust assets.
Because trust assets are becoming increasingly financialized, two
questions frequently arise: what are the parameters for the delegation
of trust functions, and what are the requirements for the investment of
trust assets? As to the first question, the modern trend is to permit the
delegation of essential investment functions. 209 As to the second, the
modern trend is also more permissive. The conservative “prudent man
rule,” which emphasizes preservation of trust funds and derivation of
income 210 and at one time shied away from stock, 211 has been
supplanted by the “prudent investor standard,” which evaluates risk
not in isolation but on a portfolio basis. 212 The new standard
incorporates the Modern Portfolio Theory to confront, and even
embrace, financial risk, so long as it is properly diversified. 213
A breach of fiduciary duty can be remedied by damages,
known as a “surcharge,” against the offending trustee. 214 Surcharges
can take the form of lost profits 215 or appreciation damages, 216 and

208

UTC § 804.
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR R ULE (1992)
(delegation permitted) and UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT (1994), 7B U.L.A. 16
(Supp. 1995) (delegation permitted) [hereinafter UPIA], with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 171, 224(2)(b). For the academic debate, see John H.
Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81
IOWA L. REV. 641 (1996); Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense:
Fiduciary Standards and Trust Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713 (2006); Stewart
E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent Is Modern Prudent Investor
Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (2010).
210
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227; Harvard College v. Armory, 26
Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).
211
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. m (1959).
212
UPIA § 2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TRUSTS: THE PRUDENT INVESTOR R ULE.
213
On the academic and policy debate, see Joel C. Dobris, Speculations on the Idea
of “Speculation,” in Trust Investing: An Essay, 39 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 439
(2004); C. Boone Schwartzel, Is the Prudent Investor Rule Good for Texas?, 54
BAYLOR L. REV. 701 (2002).
214
See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great West, 103 COLUM L. REV. 1317, 135253 (2003).
215
E.g., if assets are improperly retained or acquired. See Schwartzel, supra note
213, at 810-17; Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1383, 1390 (Colo. 1989).
216
E.g., if a fiduciary improperly sells estate assets, in a conflicted transactions, for
less than market value. See Matter of Estate of Mark Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 32122 (1977); Matter of Estate of Janes, 90 N.Y.2d 41, 55 (1997).
209
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they can be imposed if the trust suffers no loss 217 or if the trustee
makes no profit. 218 Where the duty of loyalty has been abrogated,
courts often mete out damages that overcompensate an aggrieved
principal, so as to deter errant agents. 219 This is, in part, because selfdealing and other disloyal behavior is so difficult to uncover.
b.

Redistributive reforms

Empirical questions will dictate how fiduciary duties can be
reconfigured for redistribution. Trustees are diverse, as are
beneficiaries. Family members and friends are often called upon to
serve as trustees; what they lack in investment expertise, they redeem
in awareness of settlor and beneficiary dynamics. 220 Of course, with
the financialization of trust assets, settlors are looking to professional
trustees with greater frequency. Even then, however, it can be difficult
to discern the relative wealth of trustees and beneficiaries. 221
For the above reasons, it cannot be said that a blanket
prohibition on contracting out of fiduciary duties serves distributive
ends efficiently. There may well be normative reasons for resisting the
evisceration of trustee fiduciary duties. 222 From a welfare economics
perspective, however, fiduciary duties are too indeterminate to justify
a wholesale assault or defense of the contractarian trend. 223 In other
words, we cannot confidently claim that holding trustees to inflexible
duties of care, loyalty, and good faith adequately shifts wealth from
rich to poor. Nor can we confidently claim the opposite—that allowing
those duties to be waived is an effective means of redistribution.
Unexpectedly, the modern trend in the Third Restatement may
strike the right balance: authorize the delegation of investment
217
RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF TRUSTS § 205(a); Coster v. Crookham, 468 N.W.2d
802, 806-07 (Iowa) (1991).
218
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205(b) (1992); UTC § 1002(a)(1).
219
See, e.g., Tarnowski v. Respo, 51 N.W.21 801 (Minn. 1952).
220
See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at 580 (discussing considerations in the
selection of trustees).
221
Another evaluation, implicated by the Modern Portfolio Theory but not directly
addressed here, is the relative wealth of current versus future trust beneficiaries. To
the extent that the transition from the prudent man regime to the Modern Portfolio
Theory favors current over future beneficiaries, see Schwartzel, supra note 213, this
inquiry may also be relevant to redistribution.
222
See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of
Default Rules, 94 Geo. L.J. 67, 70 (2005) [hereinafter Leslie, Trusting Trustees]
(“labeling fiduciary duties ‘default rules’ threatens to strip fiduciary rules of their
moral content”).
223
See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 16, at 457-58.
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functions, 224 but discipline the wayward trustee with lost-profit
damages. 225 With this combination, investment professionals are
likelier to assume the helm; yet their violations of duty trigger
damages that transfer of wealth back to beneficiaries.
If professional trustees are wealthier on average than trust
beneficiaries, then additional modifications can be made. Rather than
reinstating a prudent man standard or prohibiting waivers on fiduciary
duty (which would divert wealth from lay trustees to beneficiaries),
fiduciary law could hold professional trustees to a higher standard. 226
Additionally, lost profits could be awarded more liberally—for
example, to remedy breaches of the duty of care in addition to the duty
of loyalty. 227 Finally, the causal link for damages could be relaxed.
The current view adopts a proximate cause analysis to surcharging
trustees: if losses would have occurred in the absence of a breach of
trust—say, because the entire market moved downward, not just the
portfolio’s investments—then the causal link is severed. 228 This view
effectively treats breach of fiduciary duty as a tort, which in corporate
law has been controversial for its burdens on shareholder-plaintiffs. 229
3.

Beneficiaries versus beneficiaries: Abatement, ademption,
cy pres, and execution formalities

Rules that govern relations among beneficiaries comprise a
fourth category of rules in trusts and estates. These rules perform a
variety of functions, but overall, they work to resolve ambiguities in
wills and trust instruments. This Subsection utilizes abatement,
ademption, cy pres, and execution formalities to explore the
redistributive potential of this category of rules. 230
224

See supra note 209.
See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
226
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 cmt. a (1959) (“if the trustee has
a greater degree of skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is liable for a
loss resulting from the failure to use such skill as he has”). This view was not wholly
rejected by the UTC. See UTC § 804 cmt. (“This section appropriately bases the
standard on the purposes and other circumstances of the particular trust.”). See also
id. § 806; UPIA § 2(f).
227
On the traditional reluctance to do so, see, e.g., Matter of Janes, 90 N.Y.2d at 55.
228
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. f (1959).
229
See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (requiring
proof that breach of care proximately caused shareholder losses is contrary to well
established Delaware precedent on a plaintiff’s burden of proof in duty of care
cases).
230
This list is not exhaustive of the category. We could also add other rules such as
incorporation by reference, which determines whether devises made without
testamentary formalities (e.g., written on a separate notebook) are part of the general
225
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Using these rules to effectuate redistribution is likely to attract
the criticism of haphazardness in two ways. 231 First, redistribution
unfolds only when certain ambiguities plague wills, and then only
among the beneficiaries who are implicated. 232 Second, the rules may
effectuate wrong-way redistribution that favors the well-off and
exacerbates inequality. 233
a.

Background

One subset within this category is rules of construction
triggered by ambiguities in “devises,” or bequests. Abatement, for
example, occurs when a testator’s estate is too small to satisfy all
devises. Rules of abatement establish a hierarchy for satisfying devises
unless a will provides otherwise. 234 During probate, the court classifies
all devises—bequests of a specifically described item are “specific,”
bequests paid out of the estate’s general assets are “general,” and all
other bequests in a will are “residuary.” 235 The rules typically stipulate
that residuary devises “abate” (i.e., are extinguished or reduced pro
rata) first, then general devisees, and finally specific devises. 236
Hence, the order of abatement protects specific devises. Yet the order
can be altered to meet policy objectives. At least one legislature has
determined that devises to spouses enjoy first priority, so that they
abate after specific devises. 237
Ademption proceeds in the reverse order, so that specific
devises are extinguished first. If a specifically devised asset is not
found in the estate, then the devise has “adeemed” (failed). 238
scheme of distribution, see UPC §§ 2-510, and lapse, which determines whether a
devise to a beneficiary who has passed away before the decedent must fail or go to
alternate takers, see UPC § 2-603.
231
Haphazardness is a criticism of legal rules found throughout the double distortion
literature. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the
Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing
Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 832 (2000).
232
See Sanchirico, supra note 14, at 1051 (“potential objection to redistribution by
private-law rules begins with the assertion that the redistributive event in the private
law is random rather than periodic, and narrowly focused rather than broad-based”).
233
Id. at 1055.
234
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-902 [hereinafter UPC]; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra
note 136, at§ 8.4.
235
MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at 340-41; RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF
PROPERTY § 5.1 (1999). This excludes demonstrative devises, which exhibit a blend
of specific and general traits. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at 341.
236
See supra note 230.
237
See, e.g., Iowa Code § 633.436.
238
See UPC §§ 2-606, 2-609; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at§ 8.2.
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However, two alternatives enable the specific devisee to take
something nonetheless. First, state law can construe ademption
narrowly, permitting beneficiaries to inherit the value of an
extinguished devise unless the will provides otherwise. 239 Second,
when one beneficiary is pitted against another, a probate court can
classify ademption and specific devises narrowly or broadly to favor
the more sympathetic beneficiary. 240
Finally, a devise to a charitable organization can be frustrated
if the organization becomes defunct. To fulfill a generalized
philanthropic intent, courts invoke the cy pres doctrine to transfer the
bequest to another charity. 241 Cy pres enables redirecting trust funds
to alternate institutions, 242 modifying trusts to work around tax law
changes, 243 and eliminating racial and religious restrictions in
devises. 244 As a type of equitable power to modify trusts, cy pres can
apply to a plethora of situations, though some scholars assert that it is
not utilized enough. 245 More than the other rules of construction, an
aggressive use of cy pres is not likely to encounter academic
opposition because it likely achieves both donor intent and
efficiency. 246
The other subset within the category of rules governing interbeneficiary relations pertains to will execution formalities. 247 Every
state sets forth formalities that must be met when a will is executed
(e.g., how a will should be signed and witnessed). These strictures date
to the medieval Statute of Wills 248 and perform four key functions of
wills. 249 Yet, punctilious as they may seem, formalities do yield to
other considerations. Formalities can bend for holographic and
electronic wills, where other indicia of authenticity exist and courts

239

This is the result in jurisdictions that have adopted the UPC. See UPC § 2-606.
See, e.g., McGee v. McGee, 122 R.I. 837 (1980).
241
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959) (“[I]f the settlor m
manifested a more general intention to devote the [trust] property to charitable
purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the application of the property
to some charitable purpose that falls within the general charitable intention of the
settlor.”).; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at 445-50.
242
See Estate of Crawshaw, 249 Kan. 388 (1991).
243
See UTC § 416.
244
See Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966);
Howard Savings Inst. v. Peep, 170 A.2d 39 (N.J. 1961).
245
See LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 129 (1955).
246
See POSNER, supra note 125, at 441.
247
See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136, at §§ 4.1-4.5.
248
See id.; Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. 8, c.1 (1540).
249
I.e., the protective, channeling, evidentiary, and ritual functions. See MCGOVERN
ET AL., supra note 136, at 198-99.
240
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take liberties to avoid the alternative of intestacy. 250 Even more
unsettling, courts can play up or minimize the failure to abide by
execution formalities to arrive at the natural outcomes. 251

b.

Redistributive reforms

Rules of construction and execution formalities can facilitate
redistribution in two ways: through broad, ex ante prescriptions by
legislatures or through specific decisions by courts during ex post
litigation. An example of wholesale legislative reform is the
adjustment to abatement priorities favoring surviving spouses. 252 Yet
it is hard to imagine another interest group either powerful enough or
sympathetic enough to successfully lobby for such a carve-out.
Moreover, in the abstract, inter-beneficiary rules are likely to be
indeterminate—that is, it cannot be generalized that one type of
beneficiary is sufficiently wealthier that we should set applicable rules
to a default position that transfers wealth away from these
beneficiaries. Doing so may lead to wrong-way distribution in which
the winners were wealthier than the losers from the outset. 253
The other way to redistribute by these rules is through courts
in probate and trust litigation. Where a will is ambiguous or its
execution ceremony deficient, courts could construe rules to benefit
the economically worse-off party. In an ademption setting, a court
could classify as general (instead of specific) those devises to the
poorer beneficiary. If a devise to a charitable organization failed, a
court exercising cy pres power might consider the relative economic
stations of the will’s residuary beneficiaries versus the populations
who would be served if the devise passed to an alternate charity.
There is precedent or taking these liberties. Classification of
devises is an imprecise endeavor; interpreting similarly drafted
provisions, two courts could come out diametrically. 254 Some of the

250

“Holographic wills are wholly handwritten by the testator.” Id. at 212. See, e.g.,
Zhao v. Wong, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1198 (1995). Electronic wills are created, signed,
and/or executed on an electronic medium. See, e.g., In re Estate of Javier Castro,
2013-ES-00140 (Ct. Comm. Pl. Lorain Cnty., Probate Div., Ohio, June 19, 2013).
251
I.e., outcomes that cohere with probate judges’ preconceptions of what most
testators want—usually to take care of close family members. Leslie, The Myth of
Testamentary Freedom, supra note 39.
252
See supra note 237.
253
See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 90, at 1375-76.
254
Compare Halsam v. Alvarez, 70 R.I. 212 (1944), with In re DeVoss, 474 N.W.2d
542 (Iowa 1991).
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iconic cases on rules of construction result in beneficiaries who had
been provided little to nothing under the will prevailing over
beneficiaries who had already received much of the estate. 255
Execution formalities, too, can bend to arrive at “just” results. 256
Finally, there is even an efficiency dimension to the cy pres doctrine,
whose application tends to enhance the welfare of the many at the
expense of a few beneficiaries. 257 If in each of these circumstances, if
equity and efficiency justifications were replaced or supplemented
with redistributive considerations, then these rules too could be
enlisted in the struggle against inequality.
The attractiveness of these rules lies in their application.
Courts can weigh the relative wealth of the beneficiaries on a case-bycase basis. The rules can also foster positive interactions among
beneficiaries, prompting settlement or dialogue to resolve their
differences. 258 Yet here lies the vulnerability of the rules as well.
These rules do not apply as broadly as tax laws, and they would only
redistribute among the beneficiaries who are affected. Hence, their
redistribution is haphazard—of random and limited effect. 259 The
retort to this criticism is that these rules are merely one facet of a
broader strategy to overhaul all rules governing wealth. Small as their
effect might be, they can fill gaps overlooked by the tax system as well
as other rules.
Another criticism is that the redistributive burden will fall to
the beneficiaries of testators who cannot afford expert draftsmen.
Slipshod lawyers are more prone to committing the ambiguities and
errors that trigger these rules, but the ultra-rich do not hire such
lawyers. The generic response to this observation, which is of little
consolation, is that the tax system is also rife with loopholes. 260 In this
255
See, e.g., McGee, 122 R.I. (devise of bank account balances to grandchildren,
who already received stock, deemed specific and therefore abated so that friend of
decedent could receive $20,000); Clark v. Greenhalge, 411 Mass. 410 (1991)
(separate notebook of testatrix deemed incorporated by reference into the will so that
a sentimental painting goes to testatrix’s friend rather than her nephew, who already
received much of the estate). Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the
prevailing beneficiaries are poorer overall than the losing beneficiaries.
256
See Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, supra note 39.
257
See POSNER, supra note 125, at 441.
258
See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 97, at 390 (“[Redistribution by rules] is more
conducive to advancing objective goods such as self-respect, accomplishment and
appropriate relationships; enhances the recipients’ valuation of the things they have
been given; and may decrease both the givers’ opposition to the redistribution and
the injury to their welfare.”).
259
See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
260
See Sanchirico, supra note 14, at 1013.
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way, the rules approximate the tax system, where savvy lawyers and
financial planners help the rich avoid taxation, leaving the burden to
the rest of us. 261 Legal rules, in other words, are not unique in this
aspect.
Like other lines of criticisms and counterarguments sampled in
this Article, the exchanges explored above derive from the double
distortion discourse over whether rules or taxes are better at
redistribution. This discourse is not tailored enough to rules governing
inter-beneficiary disputes to be useful for our purposes. These rules
may well shift the redistributive burden to estates that cannot pay
fancy lawyers, but they may also capture a segment of smaller estates
that are overlooked by reforms to the RAP, APTs, and fiduciary duties.
More holistically, all of these reforms should be integrated into a
model that factors in concerns unique to the rules governing the
transmission of wealth. The next Section undertakes this objective.
IV.

ASSEMBLING A UNIFYING THEORY

This Article has proposed several reforms to the legal rules of
trusts and estates to combat inequality. Yet to assemble a truly
unifying theory on the laws governing wealth, one that integrates trusts
and estates with business law, several additional questions must be
addressed. First, how should we tolerate doctrinal divergences in the
laws governing the transmission of wealth versus the laws governing
the generation of wealth? Second, should the legal rules of trusts and
estates defer at all to notions of fairness? Third, how do the reform
proposals rank in distributive efficiency?
A. Doctrinal Asymmetries and Spillover Effects
Several of the reforms explored in this Article will take trust
law out of synchronization with business law. For instance, the
proposed constraints on spendthrift and asset protection trusts are
more aggressive than their analogs in corporate law regarding limited
liability. This is in part because fraudulent conveyance and
misrepresentation are too weak for distributive purposes in trusts and
estates. 262 Hence, if these proposals are adopted, we may see more tort
261

See Alan Rusbridger, Panama: The Hidden Trillions, N.Y. BOOKS, Oct. 27, 2016
(The economic system is, basically, that the rich and the powerful exited long ago
from the messy business of paying tax . . . . They don’t pay tax anymore, and they
haven’t paid tax for quite a long time.”) (quoting Luke Harding, The Guardian;
internal quotations omitted).
262
See supra notes 154-55 and 169 and accompanying text.
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creditor exceptions in trusts and estates than in corporate law. 263
Similarly, proposals to raise duty of care standards and damages for
breach do not align with corporate law, which confers directors and
officers with substantive and procedural protections that encourage
risk-taking. 264
These asymmetries may produce spillover effects. One
possibility is that business law will follow suit by bolstering creditor
protections and tempering contractarianism. This would vitiate
modern trends, but it is not wholly improbable, given that concerns
about inequality are prompting similar calls for reform in business
law. 265 After all, this is how law often changes: an early mover,
venturing into unfamiliar terrain, ends up prompting a paradigm
shift. 266 The opposite possibility is that the limited liability and
fiduciary duty contractarianism of corporate law could rein contrary
trends in trusts, so that redistributive reforms would be short-lived.
Equally likely, the reforms may not spill over at all. Instead,
the asymmetries may become ingrained, so that parallel doctrines in
business law and trusts and estates end up treading different paths.
After law, contract law (the basis for corporate law) and trust law
evolved separately to begin with. 267
Trust law exceptionalism has been the subject of intense
debate for nearly a quarter-century. 268 In 1998, Professors Hansmann
and Mattei published a pair of articles arguing that trust law’s central
contribution is its asset partitioning function. 269 Partitioning enables
assets to be pledged in separate bundles to different classes of
263

See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text. Again, the denial of remedy to
involuntary creditors has troubled corporate commentators enough to propose
constraining limited liability in business law as well. See Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 170.
264
In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Deriv. Litig., 2009 WL 481906 (business
judgment rule).
265
See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
266
Indeed, in trusts, contractarianism took off because of initial forays in corporate
law, after which other fields followed suit.
267
Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 222, at 73-76.
268
If you count the associated debate over whether trust law is contractarian, this
history stretches back over a century. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L.J. 625, 643-50 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein,
Contractarian Basis](chronicling the debate between Frederic Maitland and August
Scott).
269
See See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434 (1998)
[hereinafter Hansmann & Mattei, Functions of Trust Law]; Trust Law in the United
States: A Basic Study of Its Special Contribution, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 133
(1998).
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creditors, 270 a function that cannot be replicated by contract. 271 The
corollary—that fiduciary duties are a less convincing explanation for
trust law’s distinctiveness, since they can be reproduced as a body of
contracts—has proven to be far more controversial. 272 Hansmann and
Mattei’s thesis can be read as a variation on the “end of history”
arguments that were circulating in the early post-Cold War era, when
ebullient scholars predicted worldwide convergence in political
systems, 273 corporate law, 274 and apparently trusts and enterprise
organization. 275 In another sense, however, their thesis is a
continuation of the attempt by scholars to read contractarianism—or,
as Professor Langbein would argue, to re-read contractarianism—into
trusts law. 276 Either way, the central question is whether trusts law is
distinct enough to merit its divergence from trends in corporate law.
Answering “no” are the contractarians. 277 Answering “yes” are
scholars who emphasize trust law’s moral content, 278 unique history
and dynamics, 279 and the primacy it places upon fiduciary duties. 280

270

Hansmann & Mattei, Functions of Trust Law, supra note 237, at 438.
Id. at 453.
272
For criticisms, see, e.g., Thomas P. Gallanis, The Contribution of Fiduciary Law,
in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST (Lionel Smith ed. 2013) [hereinafter Gallanis,
Contribution of Fiduciary Law]; Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law as Fiduciary
Governance Plus Asset Partitioning, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST (Lionel Smith
ed. 2013); Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 222.
273
See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
274
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).
275
See Hansmann & Mattei, Functions of Trust Law, supra note 237, at 479 (“We
are left, then, with the question whether the differences between [trusts and
corporates] are in any way fundamental, or whether the roles now served by these
two forms could both be served as well by a single legal form that by itself imposes
little beyond the asset partitioning that is their lowest common denominator . . .”).
276
Langbein argued that the contractarian basis was in trusts law all along, though
Scott took the field on a tangent. See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 236,
at 644. The precursors were FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996), and, of course, Ronald Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). The trust-law-as-default-rules
analysis extended by Sitkoff, Agency Costs Theory, supra note 184, and, if we
include law and economics analysis of trusts more broadly, Kelly, Restricting
Testamentary Freedom, supra note 5.
277
E.g., Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 236; Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom
of Testation/Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180 (2011).
278
E.g., Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 222.
279
E.g., id.; Deborah S. Gordon, Trusting Trust, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 497 (2015).
280
E.g., Gallanis, Contribution of Fiduciary Law, supra note 240. Gallanis also
argues that fiduciary duties cannot easily be replicated by contract.
271
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This Article embraces a more functional approach to trust law
exceptionalism. It takes no position on whether trusts are grounded in
moral obligation or unique history. Instead, this Article hitches the
field’s claim of uniqueness to utilitarianism—that is, trust law is
unique because it has to be unique. Given the gravity of inequality’s
consequences and the inability of trusts and estates to counteract
inequality through the tax system, the legal rules must step in, even if
it fosters inconsistencies in doctrines shared with business law.
B. Fairness versus Welfare
If the law were only to serve distributive ends, its results would
defy our sense of fairness. 281 Fairness encompasses justice, equity,
rights, and related concepts; under the technical formulation of
Professors Kaplow and Shavell, fairness is everything that is not
welfare. 282 Welfare, meanwhile, is shorthand for social welfare, which
is the aggregation of every individual’s well-being in society. 283 Over
a decade ago, Professors Kaplow and Shavell asserted provocatively
that the law should only serve welfare, disregarding fairness
altogether. 284 As expected, this austere endorsement of utilitarianism
was denounced by scholars who argue that law should at least partially
reflect moral norms. 285 One recurring criticism among the detractors
has been that fairness better captures our preferences than welfare;
hence, the welfare calculus should make room for noneconomic
considerations such as fairness. 286
In trusts and estates, normative principles are so deeply
embedded that a single-minded pursuit of redistribution would be
scorned. The overriding principle in the field is testamentary

281

See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note 90.
See id. at 38-41.
283
Id. at 24-28.
284
See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 16.
285
On the placement of Kaplow and Shavell’s argument within the deonticutilitarian debate, see Coleman, supra note 91. On how Kaplow and Shavell fit into
the consequentialist and welfare spectrum, see Christopher P. Taggart, Fairness
versus Welfare: The Limits of Kaplow and Shavell’s Pareto Argument, 99 MARQ. L.
REV. 661 (2016).
286
Farnsworth, supra note 196, at 2015-18. Curiously, the efficiency-only position
seems to have been rejected long ago in the welfare economics literature on which
Kaplow and Shavell base their argument. See FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra note
16, at xv (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL C HOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2nd
ed., 1963)).
282
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freedom, 287 which so dominates conceptions of fairness that limiting
principles are exceedingly rare. 288 This is not to suggest, though, that
testamentary freedom cannot be abridged on equity grounds. For
example, Professor Leslie has shown that courts can bend will
formalities to ensure that surviving family members are provided for,
regardless of whether the testator’s will does so. 289 Apart from
testamentary freedom, fiduciary duties too are pregnant with moral
and ethical obligations. 290
The normative vocabulary—or, if we adopt Kaplow and
Shavell’s succinct definition, fairness—therefore pervades trusts and
estates. Consequently, the reduction of beneficiary-beneficiary
relations to a distributive function (i.e., the fourth category of legal
rules) would surely offend our sense of fairness. Testamentary intent
would be routinely vitiated. Poor beneficiaries might be viewed as
receiving a windfall if they had led a life of inebriation or sloth or
treated the testator badly. To the extent that our well-being is enhanced
by the law’s pursuit of fairness, 291 and to the extent that these results
strike us as unfair, overemphasis on redistribution in these
circumstances would be cavalier.
The path to a unifying theory therefore cannot completely
disregard fairness. The strategy must be to “weaken fairness
requirements until they capture basic, sensible, and perhaps contextspecific ethical objectives that are compatible with efficiency
requirements.” 292 Of course, more work must be done on the extent to
which fairness should defer to welfare. Once the proper balance is
struck, we can turn to the equally complicated task of devising feasible
policy. 293

287

See supra note 41. Note, however, that testamentary freedom and fairness do not
always align.
288
See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (“[T]he right to pass on property—
to one’s family in particular—has been part of the Anglo-American legal system
since feudal times . . . . [T]otal abrogation of the right to pass property is
unprecedented and likely unconstitutional.”). For this reason, the limitations on
testamentary power are themselves limited. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 136,
at Ch. 3. Certainly inequality-based justifications have previously met with little
success, due to the reliance on progressive taxation. See id. at 133.
289
See Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, supra note 39.
290
See Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 222.
291
Farnsworth, supra note 196, at 2015-16; Coleman, supra note 91, at 1512-13.
292
FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra note 16, at 235.
293
Complications include setting the right incentives to get the parties involved to
communicate their preferences (economic and non-economic) to judges and
lawmakers, as well as the political feasibility of deviations from the status quo. See
id. at 236.
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C. Distributive Efficiency
If we were to construct a hierarchy on the distributive
efficiency of the reforms explored in this Article, the RAP and
exceptions to APTs would occupy the top rung. In combination,
dynasty trusts and APTs have permitted settlors to squirrel away some
trillions of dollars. 294 Dynasty trust and APT reform are attractive in
that the distribution flows from the very wealthy. Where these rules
intersect with the tax system, there is the additional benefit that
distributions can flow to the weighted priorities built into public
programs—assuming that we trust the government with adequately
weighting its distribution for maximum redistributive efficacy. 295
Yet we should not abandon redistribution at the more granular
level of inter-beneficiary relations. The fourth category of trusts and
estates’ rules might only transfer wealth between two discrete parties
affected by litigation. Nonetheless, as part of a holistic model
integrating the tax system, business law, and other rules in trusts and
estates, inter-beneficiary distributions capture what the other schemes
omit. Put metaphorically, if every bucket has holes, then water (i.e.,
wealth) is best caught by nesting buckets together with different
holes. 296 In this rubric, even “weakly redistributive” results that
transfer wealth between discrete parties in litigation can play a role. 297

294

See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds, supra
note 108, at 404 & n.125 ($100 billion in trust assets moved from the abolition of
the GST tax and 2003); Alan Rusbridger, Panama: The Hidden Trillions, N.Y.
BOOKS, Oct. 27, 2016 ($7.6 trillion in wealth is deposited in tax havens globally)
(citing economist Gabriel Zucman). For an account of one creditor’s foray into the
world of offshore APTs, see Nicholas Confessore, How to Hide $400 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2016.
295
Welfare economics can pursue a variety of allocations. For instance, an allocation
can give absolute priority to the worst-off member of a society. However, imagine
the following hypothetical: the absolute worst-off member has a utility measurement
of 8.9, 1000 people comprising the next worse-off group measure at 9.1, and the
other 1000 members of society measure at 100. Absolute priority to the worst off
overlooks the next worse-off. It is up to policymakers to derive a priority that weighs
these considerations appropriately. See Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and
Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745, 752-52 (2003) (citing THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL
QUESTIONS 125 (1979)); F LEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra note 16, at 39-45.
296
See Sanchirico, supra note 14, at 357. For more technical explanations, see
FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra note 16, at
297
I borrow the “weakly redistributive” terminology from the welfarist conception
of weak Pareto efficiency, in which one allocation is better than another if each of
the relevant actors prefers it. See id. at 8.
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Legitimately, critics might denounce wealth transfer schemes
premised upon litigation as inefficient because the fail to provide clear
ex ante prescriptions and instead incentivize lawsuits. 298 Yet from the
standpoint of administrative efficiency, probate judges have insights
into the preferences and relative wealth of the relevant parties at a level
of intimacy that administrative agencies simply do not. 299 From the
standpoint of feasibility, wholesale transfers crafted by legislatures
may simply be impossible.
Within this distributive efficiency rubric, fiduciary duties sit
somewhere in the middle, between the RAP and APTs on one end on
rules of construction and execution facilities on the other. Reforms to
fiduciary duties are likelier to be more indeterminate. 300 On these
points and also the design of empirical research to address
redistributive indeterminacy, future work must follow.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article lays the foundation for a theory of inequality that
unifies laws regulating the generation and transmission of wealth. It
also evaluates the redistributive potential of the legal rules within
trusts and estates. With proper justification, the goal of welfare
enhancement can overcome the field’s entrenched notions of fairness
such as freedom of testation. This Article proffers the perils of
inequality as such a justification, perils severe enough to also merit
doctrinal divergences in business law and trusts and estates.
Further work is needed to resolve the distributive
indeterminacy of the rules. Empirical research in particular could
establish a ranking of the distributive efficiency of reforms proposed
in this Article. Notwithstanding such a ranking, the best result may be
all-encompassing, nesting the weakly redistributive mechanisms
within more sweeping ones.
The ultimate goal is to harness the redistributive potential of
trusts and estates. Much of the law and economics discourse on
redistribution by legal rules unfolds abstractly, 301 with boilerplate
298
See Mark L. Ascher, The 1990s Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, Or
More Like the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1993) (decrying
litigation incentives in the UPC).
299
Or agencies simply cannot achieve this intimacy of knowledge without huge
expenditures. See Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 14, at 11.
300
See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
301
For instance, Kaplow and Shavell popularized the exploration of fairness versus
welfare through abstract tort-law hypotheticals. See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness
versus Welfare, supra note 90, at 1039. In turn, critics have responded with abstract
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defenses arguing that the tax system is just as difficult to administer as
legal rules and just as susceptible to forum selection. 302 Similarly,
welfare economics can quickly descend into obscure theorems and
mathematical proofs. 303 Welfare economics and law and economics
provide the framework, but the content must be filled out by diving
into the rules, norms, and efficiencies of the specific context.
Hopefully, this Article comprises the beginning of a larger movement
to do so for trusts and estates.

hypotheticals from other areas of law. See, e.g., Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note
14.
302
See, e.g., Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 14.
303
For a valiant attempt to keep the proofs simple, see FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET,
supra note 16.

